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Abstract 
Thanks to popularization and advancement of information and communication technology, huge 
and various data have been created, transacted, and stored in human communities. Although only 
the members of each community use the data, the data would also be worthy to be used to the 
other purposes of third parties. However, the data cannot be shared with third parties without 
any restrictions due to privacy concerns. The restrictions have to be defined while concerning 
requirements of the third party, i.e. a data user, because the restrictions degrade the value of 
data. The definition is required for each transaction of data sharing since both restrictions and 
requirements are different among the transactions. 
A data transaction infrastructure for safe and flexible sharing of private information (DTI4SFS) 
is proposed in this study to achieve data sharing from data providers to data users while resolving 
the problems. DTI4SFS uses anonymization techniques to prevent identification of a record of a 
specific person for safety while focusing on data sharing. For the flexibility, DTI4SFS allows both 
data providers and data users to claim their requirements regarding the data sharing by creating 
either publishing or request rules. The detail of DTI4SFS is proposed in Section 3 while describing 
the background and the related works in Section 1 and 2, respectively. 
Three methods are also proposed in this study to enhance the ability of DTI4SFS. In Section 
4, a hardware implementation of an anonymizer is proposed to overcome the bottleneck of the 
entire flow of DTI4SFS. The proposed anonymizer showed 82.3% reduction in circuit size 
compared to existing anonymizer based on TCAM. The maximum throughput of the anonymizer 
was 8.75Gbps. The throughput of the proposed anonymizer is enough to anonymize data at a line 
speed of OC48 or faster until 8.75Gbps. Additionally, in Section 5, an anonymization method 
using a self-organizing map to share time-series data is proposed so that DTI4SFS can share 
time-series data. The proposed anonymization method achieves the same level of k-anonymity 
with small information loss compared with other conventional method that each data provider 
anonymizes aggregated data without data sharing among data providers. Information loss was 
reduced up to 22%. Moreover, a watermarking method for anonymized data is proposed in Section 
6 to suppress unauthorized republishing from malicious data users. The proposed watermarking 
method consists of AES, turbo code, and a gray code converter to protect watermarking 
information from collusion attacks and distortion attacks. The experimental results showed that 
the proposed watermarking method could extract more than 95% of the watermarked information 
from anonymized data even if the data is combined with other records whose size is 95% of the 
data. Moreover, the embedding of watermarked information can be detected from data that is 30% 
of the anonymized data. Section 7 concludes this study with the future outlook of this study.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 A large amount of useful data 
Thanks to advancement and popularization of information and communications technologies, a 
large amount of data called big data have been generated, dealt, and stored by various 
organizations such as institutes, governments, and companies. The data may contain customer 
data of companies and location data of trucks. Also, the size of the stored data is massive. For 
instance, the number of users of social networking services (SNSs) increases in the past decade. 
According to [1], 65% of American adults were SNS users in 2015 whereas the percentage was 7% 
in 2005 (Figure 1-1). Amount of data of the users is so large that Scuba, which is a data 
management system in Facebook, stores around 70 TB of compressed data for real-time analysis 
[2]. Additionally, according to [3], annual size of data in the world was estimated to be 33 ZB in 
2018. The size is forecasted to increase to 175 ZB by 2025 (Figure 1-2). 
Emerging of Internet of Things (IoT) also enables aggregating and storing various types of data. 
IoT devices are used in various fields such as services in a smart city [4], industrial systems [5], 
and health care services [6]. The data contain sensor data such as electricity usage, room 
temperature, and location information. Also, actuators of IoT devices periodically send their 
status and feedback of control such as door-lock status and the current setting of an air 
conditioner. These data are periodically sent from the various devices to a data aggregator. 
 
Figure 1-1 The percentage of American adults and internet-using adults 
 who use at least one social networking site (refer to [1]) 
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1.2 Secondary use of data 
The stored data are useful for secondary use. Secondary use is a data utilization that purpose 
is different from the primary purpose when storing data. For instance, electricity usage data 
measured by a smart meter can be used to shift peak demand of electric power whereas the data 
have been originally measured to calculate power bills. In this example, the peak shift is the 
secondary use. 
Secondary use among different fields is expected as well as a secondary use in a single field 
[7]. There is an idea named open data to share data beyond the boundary of fields. According to 
[8], open data and content can be freely used, modified, and shared by anyone for any purpose. 
One of associations that promote open data is a government. Several governments of countries 
including the United States (US) and Japan provide a website to share data with citizens [9] [10]. 
The movement is called open government. Citizens can read the data and release applications 
that use the shared data. The main contents of the applications are sightseeing, disaster 
prevention, traffic, and weather because the government has originally collected the main portion 
of the shared data to take a census. 
1.3 Privacy preservation 
A data publisher has to consider private information regarding published data from the 
viewpoint of privacy protection. Private information means that information which is important 
for the source of information such as a data provider, and information which the data provider 
wants to be secret. Private information may contain an address, a result of medical check, and 
information about his/her daily life. Currently published data for open data do not include private 
information because the data are statistical data containing a large amount of data records. In 
other words, an attacker cannot detect information regarding a specific person from such the 
statistical data. In the future, more specific data, such as electricity usage data captured from 
houses in smart cities, would be shared as open data thanks to the popularization of IoT 
technology. However, data publishers have to consider the data privacy because the data may 
contain private information. In other words, the data must be modified to protect containing 
 
Figure 1-2 Annual size of data in the world (refer to [3]) 
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private information. 
For preserving private information safely, several schemes have been implemented by countries 
and unions. In 1995, the European Union (EU) implemented Data Protection Directive that official 
name is Directive 95/46/EC [11]. In the directive, a country which fulfills regulations regarding 
privacy protection only be approved to receive data containing private information from the EU. 
Especially, the EU made an agreement with the US that was named Safe Harbor Agreement in 
2001. The agreement invalided and replaced with an updated version named EU-US Privacy 
Shield in 2015 and 2016, respectively [12]. However, the content of the Data Protection Directive 
does not fit to the Internet nowadays because the directive was implemented at the very beginning 
of the Internet. To replace the directive, the EU had adopted and implemented the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016 and 2018, respectively [13]. GDPR requires several 
restrictions to a foreign company which deals with data of the EU to protect the data as same as 
the previous directive while the requirements were updated. Since international companies have 
customers in the EU, GDPR would be a de facto global standard. The Japanese government also 
have implemented an act on the protection of personal information. The original version of the 
act had implemented in 2005, and an amended version was released in 2017 [14]. The amended 
version defines personal information as data regarding people which allows identifying a record of 
a specific person even if the identification can be achieved using other data that can be referred 
easily. Both GDPR and the amended act in Japan require to protect personal information from 
data leak, and breached companies would be punished severely. 
The schemes described in the previous paragraph must be considered to share data containing 
private information. One of the ways to the sharing is using anonymization. Anonymization is a 
name of techniques that generalize information in data by modifying values of the data. The 
modification prevents identifying a specific person’s record. Namely, anonymization protects 
private information from data sharing. 
GDPR defines that anonymized data are not required to be controlled under GDPR. The 
amended version of the Japanese act on the protection of personal information also defines that 
anonymized data are not personal information if both a data anonymizer and a data user fulfill 
conditions to protect regarding private information.  
Sharing of data containing private information can be achieved using anonymization if the 
sharing fulfills conditions required by the schemes described above. There is a technical condition 
for a data anonymizer required by the Japanese act. The condition is an appropriate modification 
of anonymization. According to the definition of the act, a data value that makes a record unique 
must be deleted or generalized. The data value includes name, id, and outlier. 
Moreover, there is another condition that prohibits trying de-anonymization. This condition 
is also required for a data user. Anonymization is capable of fulfilling the conditions by selecting 
appropriate anonymization scheme and items of anonymized data. 
For achieving data sharing considering data privacy, in this study, a data transaction 
infrastructure for safe and flexible sharing of private information is proposed. The proposed 
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infrastructure focuses on privacy preservation of data but also data transaction for several reasons. 
One of the reasons is to prevent de-anonymization by combining previously published anonymized 
data. The other reason is to consider requirements regarding data sharing claimed by both a data 
provider and a data user. This consideration provides flexibility of data sharing. The proposed 
infrastructure focuses on safe data sharing as long as flexibility. Safe data sharing means that 
private information of shared data is preserved by using anonymization including de-
anonymization. Additionally, the proposed infrastructure considers how to suppress the re-
publishing of shared anonymized data by proposing watermarking of anonymized data.  
This paper is organized as follows: Related works of the proposed infrastructure and drawbacks 
of conventional studies are described in Section 2. The overview and contribution of this study 
are also described in the end of this section. The detail of the proposed infrastructure is described 
in Section 3. This study contains three further proposals to enhance the ability of the proposed 
infrastructure. The proposals, which are an anonymizer for high-speed anonymization, 
anonymization method for time-series data, and watermarking method for anonymized data, are 
proposed and evaluated in Section 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes this study. 
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2 Related works 
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) 
Private information in data has to be preserved when the data are used. Namely, disclosing of 
private information must be prevented for the preservation. On the other hand, such data are 
valuable for data mining to improve relevant services. Even though information acquired by data 
mining does not contain private information, data mining has a risk of disclosing private 
information because data mining often uses data containing private information. Techniques to 
mine data while preserving private information are called Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) 
[15] [16] [17] [18]. 
Here is an example of PPDM for marketing. Information on membership card of supermarkets 
includes shopping history of customers. The information could be valuable for each supermarket 
for marketing, and also valuable for a maker of goods sold at supermarkets to support the 
marketing or developing new products. There is two private information requiring preservation. 
One of the information is the shopping history of each customer. Some techniques such as 
anonymization can preserve this information. The other one is a data source, i.e., which 
supermarket provided the data. This data source information should be preserved because if a 
maker knew the data source, the maker could maliciously put a specific supermarket into a 
disadvantageous situation. One of the ways to keep data source secret against the maker is to 
make relationship among supermarkets. If the data source was hidden or generalized appropriately 
before providing the data to the maker, the data source would be preserved. Purpose of PPDM 
is to obtain knowledge while nobody gets disadvantages. In this example, the maker obtains 
valuable knowledge while preserving the privacies of both shoppers and supermarkets. Other 
examples are briefly shown as follows. 
y Trend analysis of symptoms using medical records while preserving information of related 
patients and hospitals. 
y Analysis of client lists of loan to detect a client who would be a bankrupt individual. Privacy 
of clients in the lists and consumer finance companies that provided the lists are preserved 
in the analysis process. 
y Referring to a client list of a company to check whether a suspect is listed in the list. The 
referring is processed while both a suspect list and the client list are not published. 
In March 2004, a workshop regarding PPDM entitled DIMACS/PORTIA Working Group 
Meeting on Privacy-Preserving Data Mining [19] was held in the US. According to the workshop, 
PPDM studies mainly used public-key encryption. In contrast, various approaches have been 
proposed nowadays. Typical methods use either encryption, perturbation, restriction of database 
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queries, and anonymization. 
2.1.1 PPDM using cryptography 
In PPDM using cryptography, data mining is processed while keeping private information 
encrypted (Figure 2-1). The calculation of data mining is divided into simple sub-calculations 
that can be processed using a special calculation tool. The tool allows to calculate data while 
keeping the data, calculation, and calculation result encrypted. Since each sub-calculation is 
encrypted, the whole calculation is also encrypted. The drawback of the PPDM is calculation 
cost. Since every sub-calculation requires a process of cryptography and network communication, 
the PPDM is generally not suitable for a large amount of data. 
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is one of the techniques of PPDM using encryption [20] 
[21] [22]. FHE allows calculating data while keeping related information encrypted. The 
information contains not only the data but also equations of the calculation. Thanks to this feature, 
data miner can ask an untrusted calculation agency to analyze data while keeping data, calculation 
result, and purpose of the data mining. Although FHE is useful to protect private information 
against divulging of information, safe data sharing cannot be achieved by using FHE only because 
FHE is not the technique to obscure the content of the information for data privacy. 
2.1.2 PPDM using perturbation 
Perturbation can be used to achieve PPDM (Figure 2-2). This PPDM has two steps. In the 
first step, noise is added into values in data before data mining. The noise of each value is 
generated by a perturbation function. A data miner analyzes the modified data while referring to 
the probability distribution of the function to estimate actual values of the data in the next step. 
Private information in data is preserved through the two steps because the original data is not 
provided to the data miner. 
Additionally, this PPDM has an advantage in terms of calculation cost compared with other 
 
Figure 2-1 Overview of PPDM using cryptography (Refer to [15]) 
 
Cryptographic 
Protocol
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PPDMs. This PPDM, therefore, suits for a large amount of data. However, using perturbation has 
a drawback regarding the guarantee of privacy preservation. Private information is preserved from 
the viewpoint of statistics only. Namely, the robustness of the preservation depends on dedicated 
perturbation function. 
2.1.3 PPDM by restricting database queries 
Privacy information in a database can be preserved when queries to the database are restricted 
appropriately. For example, an outlier should not be published because the related person of the 
outlier may be identified. This information will be preserved if only data property such as maximum 
value, minimum value, and average are accessible. 
The lack of this PPDM is a restriction of data access. Data miners cannot access data as 
he/she prefers. The rules of the restrictions have to be defined while considering the usability of 
the accessible information. 
 
Figure 2-2 Overview of PPDM using perturbation (Refer to [15]) 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Overview of PPDM using anonymization (Refer to [15]) 
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2.1.4 PPDM using anonymization 
PPDM can be achieved when anonymization is used (Figure 2-3) [23]. Anonymization 
preserves private information by generalizing values in data. There are some techniques of the 
generalization such as replacing, masking, and micro aggregation. The replacing is a technique 
to replace an original value with its abstracted value. For example, “apples” could be replaced 
with “fruits.” Some types of values such as age can be generalized by the masking a more sensitive 
part of the value. “25 years old” can be generalized to “2* years old” by using a masking 
character “*.” The micro aggregation firstly groups records along with similarity of values in each 
record. Then, values in each group are replaced with the same representative value such as an 
average. Perturbation described in Section 2.1.2 can be regarded as one of the generalization 
techniques. Anonymization guarantees irreversibility when there are no references to obtain an 
original value of anonymized data. 
Some privacy metrics to indicate anonymity level have been proposed such as 𝑘-anonymity 
[24] [25], 𝑙-diversity [26], and 𝑡-closeness [27]. Each metric represents the uniqueness level of 
a record in data from each other’s different viewpoint. 
Anonymization is adaptable for Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) as well as PPDM 
in contrast to other PPDM techniques because of two advantages as follows. One of the 
advantages is that anonymization generalizes data values. Since a modified value holds correct 
information whereas the value is generalized, a data user can obtain correct knowledge. Here is 
the other advantage that the anonymity level can be represented by the metrics. Thanks to the 
metrics, data providers can define the strength of privacy preservation clearly. Additionally, data 
users can know how much the anonymized data was generalized before obtaining the data. 
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) 
Techniques to publish data while preserving data privacy are named PPDP [23] [28]. Purpose 
of PPDP is to obtain knowledge while preserving data privacy as same as PPDM. However, PPDP 
is different to PPDM in terms of purpose. PPDP focuses on how to publish data while preserving 
data privacy whereas PPDM focuses on how to analyze data while preserving data privacy. 
Anonymization and perturbation are typical techniques of PPDP, and anonymization is selected 
in most cases. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the robustness of perturbation techniques is 
guaranteed only from the statistical perspective. According to [29], data privacy is not preserved 
enough only by using perturbation in some cases. In contrast to perturbation, a record regarding 
a specific person is not able to be specified from anonymized data as long as its original data is 
not referred. Namely, anonymization can preserve data privacy robustly rather than perturbation. 
There are many studies of anonymization techniques itself. One of the typical topics is how to 
suppress the degradation of value due to anonymization while satisfying the anonymity level [30] 
[31] [32]. Additionally, [33] proposes a method to extract valuable information from anonymized 
data. [34] focuses on the acceleration of the anonymization process. [35] and [36] try to protect 
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from attacks on anonymization. 
2.3 Privacy metrics 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.4, privacy metrics have been proposed. Some anonymization 
techniques allow controlling anonymity level by using privacy metrics. Additionally, the strength 
of privacy protection of anonymized data can be assessed based on privacy metrics. In this paper, 
technical terms regarding anonymization are defined as follows [25] [26]. 
2.3.1 Definition of technical terms 
2.3.1.1 Data table 
Data table is a table that consists of information such as a list of customers and a medical 
record. In this paper, column and row of a data table are termed “attribute” and “tuple,” 
respectively. Each tuple in the data table holds a record. Each record indicates values regarding 
a single or group of people such as customers and patients. The record consists of several values 
that are categorized by attributes. Each attribute describes an item of its column such as birthday. 
2.3.1.2 Attribute 
Attributes can be categorized according to the level of privacy information. The most critical 
type of attributes is named “identifier.” The identifier has a value that provides information to 
identify who is related to the tuple. Such information includes ID number, name, and cell-phone 
number. Some of the other attributes can be regarded as an identifier when the attribute combines 
with other attributes. Such attributes are termed “quasi-identifier.” Attributes such as birthday, 
gender, and group identifier (GID) are categorized to quasi-identifier. A group of tuples that have 
the same value in every quasi-identifier is termed “q*-block.” 
2.3.1.3 Sensitive attribute 
An attribute that is important for a data analyst is called “sensitive attribute.” Values in the 
sensitive attributes are not modified. In contrast to sensitive attribute, an attribute that is 
acceptable to be modified is named “non-sensitive attribute.” 
2.3.2 𝑘-anonymity [24] [25] 
According to [24], 𝑘-anonymity is defined as follows. 
y The data table is said to satisfy 𝑘-anonymity if and only if each sequence of values in 
quasi-identifier in the data table appears with at least 𝑘 occurrences in the quasi-identifier. 
Table 2-1 is an example of the data table. Attributes of Birth, Gender, and GID in the data 
table are quasi-identifiers while the Problem attribute is a sensitive attribute. For the readability, 
there are tuple number 𝑡. Since 𝑡 is out of the data table, anonymization for the data table does 
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not consider 𝑡. There are three q*-blocks that consist of 𝑡1~𝑡3, 𝑡4 and 𝑡5, and 𝑡6 and 𝑡7, 
respectively. Since the minimum number of tuples in the q*-block is two, the data table satisfies 
2-anonymity. Let me suppose an attacker attempts to know Problem value of a lady, who was 
born in 1980. In this situation, even though the attacker has the data table, the attacker cannot 
identify whether the Problem value is a headache or a stomachache from 𝑡4 and 𝑡5. 
When 3-anonymity is required, 𝑡4~𝑡7 in Table 2-1 will be further anonymized to Table 2-2. 
Two q*-blocks exist in the data table. Each q*-block consists of at least three tuples that are 
𝑡1~𝑡3 and 𝑡4~𝑡7. 
𝑘-anonymity seems  toeliminate the risk to ithe dentification of a record of a specific person. 
However, there are several attacks to identify information regarding a specific person. 
2.3.2.1 Homogeneity attack 
An attacker can sometimes identify a value of a record regarding a specific person even if the 
attacker cannot identify which record the person relates. This attack is named homogeneity 
attack. Table 2-3 is another example of the anonymized data table. In this data table, 𝑡1~𝑡3 
have the same value (fever) in a sensitive attribute which is Problem attribute. Therefore, an 
attacker who knows values in quasi-identifiers of Alice is able to identify her value in Problem 
attribute whereas the attacker cannot identify her tuple. 
2.3.2.2 Background knowledge attack 
𝑡4~𝑡7 in Table 2-3 have another risk of attacks named background knowledge attack. For 
Table 2-1 Data table of 𝑘 = 2 
 Quasi-identifiers Sensitive Attribute 
 Birth Gender GID Problem 
𝑡1 1980 male 121 fever 
𝑡2 1980 male 121 stomachache 
𝑡3 1980 male 121 headache 
𝑡4 1980 female 121 headache 
𝑡5 1980 female 121 stomachache 
𝑡6 1981 male 125 headache 
𝑡7 1981 male 125 fever 
 
Table 2-2 Anonymized data table of 𝑘 = 3 anonymized from Table 2-1 
 Quasi-identifiers Sensitive Attribute 
 Birth Gender GID Problem 
𝑡1 1980 male 121 fever 
𝑡2 1980 male 121 stomachache 
𝑡3 1980 male 121 headache 
𝑡4 198* no data 12* headache 
𝑡5 198* no data 12* stomachache 
𝑡6 198* no data 12* headache 
𝑡7 198* no data 12* fever 
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instance, an attacker attempts to obtain Problem value of Bob, and the attacker knows his values 
of quasi-identifiers. In contrast to the example of Alice, the attacker cannot identify his Problem 
value because there are two candidates of the value that are poor circulation and headache. 
However, the attacker can estimate the value if the attacker has background knowledge that men 
rarely gets poor circulation. Since there are only two candidates and one of the candidates is 
poor circulation, the attacker can estimate Bob has a headache. 
2.3.3 𝑙-diversity [26] 
Attacks described in 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2 are effective due to lack of variety of values in each 
q*-block. 𝑙-diversity has been proposed to overcome the attacks. Here is the definition of 𝑙-
diversity. 
y 𝑙-diversity is fulfilled when each quasi-identifier has 𝑙 or large kinds of values in each q*-
block. 
𝑙-diversity of Table 2-1, Table 2-2, and Table 2-3 are two, three, and one, respectively. Since 
the maximum value of 𝑙 is restricted by the number of tuples in the q*-block, the relationship 
between 𝑘 and 𝑙 is represented by the inequation 2-1. 
 𝑘 ≥ 𝑙  
2-1 
Here are more concrete definitions of 𝑙-diversity as follows. 
2.3.3.1 Entropy 𝑙-diversity 
Entropy 𝑙-diversity has been proposed in [37] while considering homogeneity attacks. When 
𝑝(𝑞 ∗, 𝑠) denotes the fraction of tuples which have value 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 as a sensitive attribute in q*-
block, the inequation 2-2 represents the condition to satisfy entropy 𝑙-diversity. 
 − ∑ 𝑝(𝑞 ∗, 𝑠) log(𝑝(𝑞 ∗, 𝑠))𝑠∈𝑆 ≥ log(𝑙)  
2-2 
  
Table 2-3 Another example of anonymized data table of 𝑘 = 3 
 Quasi-identifiers Sensitive Attribute  
 Birth Gender GID Problem  
𝑡1 1980 female 121 fever Alice 
𝑡2 1980 female 121 fever  
𝑡3 1980 female 121 fever  
𝑡4 198* no data 12* poor circulation  
𝑡5 198* no data 12* poor circulation  
𝑡6 198* no data 12* headache Bob 
𝑡7 198* no data 12* headache  
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2.3.3.2 Recursive (𝑐, 𝑙)-diversity [26] 
Recursive (𝑐, 𝑙)-diversity has been proposed while considering both homogeneity attacks and 
background knowledge attacks. Let 𝑟𝑖  denote the number of times the 𝑖 th most-frequent 
sensitive value in a q*-block in a data table. The q*-block satisfies (𝑐, 𝑙)-diversity when 
inequation 2-3 is fulfilled in the q*-block. 𝑛 in the inequation represents the number of values of 
the sensitive attribute in the q*-block. 𝑐 denotes a constant. The data table satisfies (𝑐, 𝑙)-
diversity when every q*-block in the data table satisfies (𝑐, 𝑙)-diversity. 
 𝑟1 < 𝑐(∑ 𝑟𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=𝑙 )  
2-3 
2.3.3.3 𝑙-diversity of multiple sensitive attributes 
When a data table has multiple sensitive attributes, the maximum 𝑙-diversity in the sensitive 
attributes is regarded as 𝑙-diversity of the data table. This is because when values of sensitive 
attributes in a tuple regard as a value group, a number of kinds of the groups equals to the 
maximum 𝑙-diversity.  
2.3.4 𝑡-closeness [27] 
As shown in 2.3.3, 𝑙-diversity lets a data table have a variety of values in sensitive values in 
order to protect data from background knowledge attacks. However, the balance of information 
entropy among q*-blocks should be considered for the further protection. In other words, a 
background knowledge attacker could identify the target tuple easily when a q*-block which has 
high information entropy compared with other q*-blocks. Difference of information entropy among 
q*-blocks should be small in order to degrade the threat of background knowledge attacks. 
𝑡-closeness has been proposed to enhance protection from background knowledge attacks 
while considering the balance of information entropy among q*-blocks. Concretely, 𝑡-closeness 
sets a threshold of a fraction of tuples based on the value of a sensitive attribute in each tuple. 
For each tuple in every q*-block, the difference of a fraction of the tuple between the q*-block 
and the data table must be smaller than 𝑡. Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [38] is used to 
calculate the difference. 
𝑡-closeness focuses on whole tuples of a data table whereas 𝑘-anonymity and 𝑙-diversity focus 
on each q*-block only. However, 𝑡-closeness is not popular compared with the other metrics 
because controlling fractions of all tuples in a data table imposes high calculation cost. 
2.4 Information loss 
Anonymization affects information value of data tables because it modifies values in data tables 
to preserve data privacy. Information Loss (𝐼𝐿) is a metric to represent how much information 
was lost due to anonymization. When a tuple 𝑡 in a data table 𝑇 is defined as 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇{𝑡1, 𝑡2 ⋯ 𝑡𝑁} 
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where quasi-identifier in 𝑇  is represented as 𝑄𝐼𝑇{𝐴1, 𝐴2 ⋯ 𝐴𝑁𝐴} , information loss 𝐼𝐿(𝑇)  is 
defined as an equation 2-4. Each quasi-identifier can be generalized up to 𝐷𝐺𝐻 times, and 
currently generalized ℎ times. Therefore, 
ℎ
|𝐷𝐺𝐻|
 denotes information loss of a value of a quasi-
identifier in a tuple. 𝐼𝐿(𝑇) denotes average of 
ℎ
|𝐷𝐺𝐻|
 in the data table. Both 
ℎ
|𝐷𝐺𝐻|
 and 𝐼𝐿(𝑇) take 
a value from zero to one. 𝐼𝐿 of a data table before anonymization is zero whereas a completely 
anonymized data table takes 𝐼𝐿 = 1. 
 𝐼𝐿(𝑇) =
∑ ∑
ℎ𝑖𝑗
|𝐷𝐺𝐻𝐴𝑖
|
𝐴𝑖∈𝑄𝐼𝑇𝑡𝑗∈𝑇
|𝑇|∙|𝑄𝐼𝑇|
=
∑ ∑
ℎ𝑖𝑗
|𝐷𝐺𝐻𝐴𝑖
|
𝑁𝐴
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁∙𝑁𝐴
  
2-4 
There are some equations to calculate 𝐼𝐿 whereas the equation 2-4 is the most typical form. 
The range of 𝐼𝐿 in this equation is 0 ≤ 𝐼𝐿 ≤ 1. Such metric is called information loss ratio. Table 
2-4 shows a calculation example of information loss ratio when values in the “address” attribute 
is masked in stages. 
Information loss is not able to be used to compare different types of data because this metric 
represents the loss of information value by measuring the frequency of generalization. In this 
paper, information loss is used to compare anonymized data that are same originally. 
2.5 De-anonymization 
Anonymized data have a risk of de-anonymization in PPDM and PPDP. De-anonymization is 
one of background knowledge attacks to re-identify an original value of the anonymized tuple 
while referring background knowledge such as private information of a targeted person obtained 
from his/her posts in SNS. Especially in PPDP, anonymized data that have already been published 
can be regarded as background knowledge.  
Table 2-2 and Table 2-5 are anonymized data tables of 3-anonymity. Both of them were made 
from Table 2-1 by different anonymization processes. Although each data table satisfies 3-
anonymity, a less anonymized data table shown in Table 2-6 appears when the two anonymized 
data tables are combined. The data table is 1-anonymity when GID is selected to a quasi-
identifier. 
2.6 Conventional studies of data sharing and these drawbacks 
As described in Section 1.2, data sharing facilitates solving of problems and advancement of 
studies. Data sharing has been especially well studied in the medical field to share study results 
of state of the art among clinical fields as soon as possible [39] [40] [41]. 
One of the ways to share data including private information is making a contract between a 
data provider and a data user to protect private information by legal aspect. The contract is 
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called the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). Although using NDA enables sharing data without 
any modifications, this advantage would be a risk of disclosure from malicious third parties. Even 
if the third party would receive a sanction, it is hard to retrieve the private information in the 
disclosed data. Therefore, data privacy must be protected by techniques of either PPDM or PPDP 
as well as legal aspect for the data sharing. 
Although techniques such as PPDM and PPDP have been investigated in numerous studies, a 
method of secure and flexible publishing the data to enable secondary use has not been definitively 
established. Balamurugan et al. propose a data partitioning method for multiparty computation 
while considering privacy preservation [42]. A dataset is divided into several parts for multiparty 
computation. The method maintains the range and size of the parts to avoid the situation that 
multiple parts of the same data are provided to a single user in order not to provide private 
information to the user. However, the method cannot use for the data sharing that this study 
considers because the method does not consider another privacy risk that multiple malicious 
users combine their provided parts to obtain the private information. Ruvan et al. propose a 
framework to share data for data mining while preserving data privacy [43]. In the framework, the 
shared database is anonymized to fulfill 𝑘-anonymity given by the database owner. However, the 
Table 2-4 Calculation example of information loss ratio 
𝐼𝐿 Address 
0 Kohoku-ku Yokohama-shi Kanagawa-ken 
1/3 *-ku Yokohama-shi Kanagawa-ken 
2/3  *-shi Kanagawa-ken 
1   * 
 
Table 2-5 Anonymized data table of 𝑘 = 3 which sensitive attribute is GID 
 Quasi-identifiers Sensitive Attribute 
 Birth Gender Problem GID 
𝑡1 198* no data * 121 
𝑡2 198* no data * 121 
𝑡3 198* no data headache 121 
𝑡4 198* no data headache 121 
𝑡5 198* no data * 121 
𝑡6 198* no data headache 125 
𝑡7 198* no data * 125 
 
Table 2-6 Data table generated from Table 2-2 and Table 2-5 
 Birth Gender GID Problem 
𝑡1 1980 male 121 fever 
𝑡2 1980 male 121 stomachache 
𝑡3 1980 male 121 headache 
𝑡4 198* no data 121 headache 
𝑡5 198* no data 12* stomachache 
𝑡6 198* no data 125 headache 
𝑡7 198* no data 12* fever 
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framework does not meet concerning the requirements of 𝑘-anonymity level from data users even 
though anonymization degrades the data quality. Additionally, the framework is not flexible in 
terms of selection of privacy preservation techniques because the framework allows using 𝑘-
anonymity only. [44] discusses how to do PPDM while supposing a data-sharing scenario for data 
mining with some types of user roles, and introduces ideas of how to make a compromise of 
privacy-preservation level among the users. However, the proposal does not consider about the 
framework of communication among users of the supposed infrastructure. Moreover, the paper is 
lack of attention regarding privacy risk by a transaction of data sharing. The proposed 
infrastructure in this study overcomes these problems. 
As described in Section 1.3, the act on the protection of personal information has been defined 
in Japan. However, there is a problem when Japanese companies transact data based on the act. 
The problem is that guidelines for the companies are different among Japanese ministries. 
Therefore, actions of the companies are different according to their related ministries. Also, the 
difference could confuse companies which are related to multiple ministries. These guidances 
must be combined into a single guidance to promote secondary use of data among different fields. 
The proposed infrastructure could take the role on the unified guidance. 
Some people may have a conservative attitude to provide data due to their anxieties about 
privacy risk even if the privacy-preserving way of the data publishing was well considered. The 
situation would happen when the entire flow of the data sharing is not sharply defined. Additionally, 
the anxieties would reduce if people whose privacy are related to data are able to actively manage 
requirements regarding the data sharing. The proposed infrastructure would solve the problems. 
Furthermore, as described in Section 2.5, after calculating and publishing anonymized data 
from a data source, another anonymized dataset, calculated and published from the same source 
may cause a privacy information leak if an unauthorized person can access both sets of 
anonymized data. When calculating and publishing anonymized data, it is necessary to consider 
all of the previously published data from the same source. 
By considering these issues, it is crucial to establish a clear suggestion of technological 
guidance, an infrastructure, and a technical standard of protocols for the secondary use of data. 
The development of the protocol and infrastructure is especially important to its development. It 
will facilitate collaboration between data providers and data users, and thus increase their data 
publishing activity. It will develop the market for secondary uses of data in conjunction with 
advanced services such as market research, estimation of a route of infection, and traffic pattern 
analysis. Moreover, it will reduce the utility costs for both providers and consumers of secondary 
use data, owing to the unification of data processing procedures. 
2.7 Objective of this study 
In this study, a data transaction infrastructure for safe and flexible sharing of private 
information (DTI4SFS) is proposed. DTI4SFS uses anonymization to preserve data privacy. 
Additionally, a protocol and XML-based data format for the proposed infrastructure are proposed. 
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DTI4SFS prevents further leaks of private information by employing the previously anonymized 
data as a publishing history. 
This study consists of three further proposals to enhance the transaction ability of DTI4SFS. 
The two of the three proposals enhance scalability of DTI4SFS from two aspects, respectively. 
One of the aspects is acceleration of the anonymization process, which is a bottleneck of the 
entire process flow. If the anonymization process becomes faster, DTI4SFS can transact large 
amount of data. Additionally, the acceleration enables situations that requires high-speed 
transaction to provide fresh information to data users. The other aspect of the scalability is 
variety of data types that DTI4SFS is able to anonymize. This study proposes an anonymization 
method for time-series data that is popular data type such as sensor data. The last proposal in 
this study is a watermarking method for anonymized data. This proposal is effective to suppress 
unauthorized republishing from malicious data users. Although this study focuses on the three 
proposals, any other technique for safe data sharing is acceptable for DTI4SFS thanks to the 
flexibility. 
The contribution of this study is the proposal of DTI4SFS.The proposed infrastructure provides 
common protocols and formats for safe data transaction that conventional studies described in 
Section 2.6 have not focused enough. DTI4SFS would facilitate safe data sharing among different 
fields for secondary use of data. Additionally, the three further proposals enhance the ability of 
the proposed infrastructure.  
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3 Data transaction infrastructure 
3.1 Concept of DTI4SFS 
DTI4SFS allows secure and flexible data sharing. The security means privacy preservation of 
private information in shared data. The flexibility means both data providers and data users can 
require or request their requirements such as contents of the data and the method of privacy 
preservation including its parameters. DTI4SFS achieves the security based on anonymization 
techniques. The security focuses not only data modification using anonymization but also data 
transactions such as multiple publishing of data anonymized from the same data. 
DTI4SFS supposes several roles as shown in Figure 3-1. Data providers provide data to 
DTI4SFS to share the data. When a data provider provides a dataset to DTI4SFS, the data 
provider creates a publishing rule that defines restrictions regarding the sharing of the data. The 
publishing rule is also submitted to DTI4SFS. Data users use data provided from DTI4SFS for 
data analyses for secondary use of the data. A data user creates a request rule when the data 
user plans to acquire a dataset. The request rule includes requirements of the data user regarding 
data sharing. The data user requests providing of the required data to DTI4SFS by submitting 
the request rule to DTI4SFS. 
3.1.1 Publishing rule 
Data providers can define restrictions regarding their providing as follows. 
y Allowable combinations of sensitive attributes: Allowable anonymity level for each 
combination is also able to be defined. 
y Items that can be allowable to be selected as quasi-identifiers: The data provider can 
define allowable anonymity levels for each quasi-identifier. 
Data providers may want to provide some items without any restrictions for reasons such as 
an advertisement. DTI4SFS allows data providers to select items as such attribute (open 
attribute). 
 
Figure 3-1 Overview of the proposed infrastructure 
 
Data publisher
Data Providers Data Users
Raw data
Anonymized data
A
A
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y Data providers can define an item as an open attribute. Open attributes will be published 
without any preservations of privacy if data users require publishing of the item. Open 
attributes are also able to be regarded as quasi-identifiers. 
3.1.2 Request rule 
Data users can request requirements using request rules as follows to obtain data from 
DTI4SFS. The data user creates the request rule according to the relevant publishing rule. Data 
users can know the detail of the provided data from regarding publishing rule. 
y Request of an anonymization method and its level. 
y Request of a combination of sensitive attributes.  
y Request of quasi-identifiers. Open attributes are also candidates of the selection. 
y Request of open attributes. 
3.2 One-directional anonymization 
As shown in Section 2.5, de-anonymization must be considered when publishing anonymized 
data. In other words, when multiple versions of anonymized data anonymized from the same data 
are published, an attacker who collected the multiple data may obtain another data that anonymity 
level is out of the permission of the publishing rule. 
Table 3-1 Example of medical record (𝑘 = 1) 
 Birth Gender Problem 
𝑡1 1970 male cold 
𝑡2 1970 male obesity 
𝑡3 1970 male diabetes 
𝑡4 1981 male diabetes 
𝑡5 1981 female obesity 
𝑡6 1982 female diabetes 
𝑡7 1982 female cold 
 
Table 3-2 Anonymized medical record generated from Table 3-1 (𝑘 = 2) 
 Birth Gender Problem 
𝑡1 1970 male cold 
𝑡2 1970 male obesity 
𝑡3 1970 male diabetes 
𝑡4 1981 human diabetes 
𝑡5 1981 human obesity 
𝑡6 1982 female diabetes 
𝑡7 1982 female cold 
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Table 3-1 is an example of a medical record data table. Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 are 
anonymized data tables anonymized from Table 3-1 in different ways. Their anonymity levels are 
𝑘 = 2 and 𝑘 = 3, respectively. It looks there are no problem when the data provider of the 
medical record permits 𝑘 ≥ 2. However, this situation actually causes de-anonymization when a 
malicious data user obtains both Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 because Table 3-1 that anonymity 
level is not permitted by the data user (𝑘 = 1) can be created by the two anonymized data tables. 
One cause of this problem is that previously published data is not referenced in the anonymization 
process; as a result, the coherence between the and data was severed. Table 3-4 is another 
example of an anonymized data table. This data table was generated by anonymizing Table 3-2 
instead of anonymizing Table 3-1, to maintain coherency in masking and generalization. 
Publishing Table 3-4 instead of Table 3-3 avoids the problem described above since Table 3-1 
cannot be obtained even if the malicious data user combines Table 3-2 with Table 3-4. The 
proposed policy of anonymizing process (one-directional anonymization) can prevent further leaks 
of privacy information. The proposed infrastructure (DTI4SFS) adopts one-directional 
anonymization to prevent de-anonymization caused by data sharing although the prevention is 
effective only for data published from a single DTI4SFS. 
3.3 Design of DTI4SFS 
DTI4SFS can be divided into four organizations as follows. Figure 3-2 represents proposed 
organizational structure and data connections between the organizations. 
Table 3-3 Anonymized medical record generated from Table 3-1 (1) (𝑘 = 3) 
 Birth Gender Problem 
𝑡1 19* male cold 
𝑡2 19* male obesity 
𝑡3 19* male diabetes 
𝑡4 19* male diabetes 
𝑡5 198* female obesity 
𝑡6 198* female diabetes 
𝑡7 198* female cold 
 
Table 3-4 Anonymized medical record generated from Table 3-2 (2) (𝑘 = 3) 
 Birth Gender Problem 
𝑡1 1970 male cold 
𝑡2 1970 male obesity 
𝑡3 1970 male diabetes 
𝑡4 198* human diabetes 
𝑡5 198* human obesity 
𝑡6 198* human diabetes 
𝑡7 198* human cold 
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3.3.1 Original data storeroom organization 
Original Data Storeroom organization (ODS) manages data provided by data providers. When 
providing data to ODS, a data provider prepares data for publishing and provides a publishing 
rule by utilizing a specially designed format. This format is termed XML-based Anonymization 
Sheets (XAS). The details of XAS are described in Section 3.4. Publishing rule descriptions utilize 
a subset of XAS, termed XML-based Anonymization Rules (XAR). The data provider converts 
data provided to ODS to XAS format and provides the converted data as D-XAS with its 
publishing rule (P-XAR). D-XAS includes a link to the P-XAR to make a connection between 
the D-XAS and the P-XAR. ODS should be responsible for maintaining the original data written 
as D-XAS in a secure manner. This data registration process is based on the PUT method.  
3.3.2 Anonymizing rules storeroom organization 
Anonymizing Rules Storeroom organization (ARS) manages P-XAR. P-XAR will be openly 
published to data users. Since P-XAR includes an index of the relevant D-XAS, data users can 
know the which contents are included without reading D-XAS. Privacy concern would not be 
happened because P-XAR does not contain any private information. P-XARs stored in the ARS 
can exhibit data when it is available for its secondary use. A P-XAR is stored by utilizing a PUT 
method issued by ODS. Data users can generate their request rules (R-XARs) based on the 
relevant P-XAR. 
3.3.3 Data anonymizing and publishing organization 
Data Anonymizing and Publishing organization (DAP) anonymizes D-XAS according to its P-
XAR and R-XAR. The R-XAR is generated and submitted to DAP by the data user in advance. 
The DAP receives the header of the requested D-XAS to access the link of the R-XAR. This 
header information does not include data. This header information is also described by using an 
XAR termed H-XAR; the DAP verifies its compliance by checking with the R-XAR and P-XAR 
requested from the ARS, according to the H-XAR. In this process, the data user utilizes a GET 
method in conjunction with the R-XAR option. If it returns a compliance error, the data user 
 
Figure 3-2 Design of the proposed infrastructure 
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receives an appropriate error message based on the HTTP error message protocol. If no error 
occurs, DAP issues a GET message to obtain the D-XAS from the ODS, and issues a subsequent 
GET message to receive the published XAS (P-XAS) from Published Data Storeroom organization 
(PDS). PDS is described in the next Section (3.3.4). The DAP generates a P-XAS as anonymized 
data, and the response from the data user sent the R-XAR. The user receives the anonymized 
data resulting from the GET method. Finally, the DAP stores the generated P-XAS issues by 
utilizing the PUSH method. This P-XAS is utilized to prevent further privacy leaks. 
3.3.4 Published data storeroom organization 
PDS manages data previously published by the DAP as P-XASs. It may store all anonymized 
data generated by the DAP. However, to optimize data storage capacity, it is sufficient for the 
PDS to store only one P-XAS as anonymized data for each D-XAS, according to the one-
directional anonymization policy. When generating P-XASs from D-XASs according to the 
requested R-XAR, it is sufficient to generate P-XASs according to the R-XAR, and store the P-
XAS to the PDS. However, when generating another P-XAS from the same D-XAS according to 
another R-XAR, the DAP should obtain all P-XASs related to the D-XAS from the PDS. The 
DAP should consider all of these P-XASs when generating new P-XASs to observe P-XARs. The 
proposed infrastructure adopts the one-directional anonymization policy to avoid this process as 
following steps. 
1. DAP generates P-XASs according to P-XARs, instead of R-XARs, and stores it in the 
PDS. Therefore, the PDS stores the anonymized data, and it is anonymized according 
to the declared level in P-XAR. This P-XAS is not sent to the users if the requested 
level in the R-XAR is higher than the level in the P-XAR; this indicates the value is 
larger than that of the P-XAR in 𝑘-anonymity.  
2. DAP generates P-XASs according to the R-XARs. In this generation, the DAP only 
uses the initial P-XAS generated from the P-XAR in the previous step. DAP generalizes 
new P-XASs by generalizing appropriate values according to the R-XARs from the 
initial P-XAS. The DAP does not revert any of the generalized values in the first P-
XAS. Therefore, a one-directional anonymization process should be considered. 
3. DAP can generate any type of P-XAS that satisfies both the R-XAR and the P-XAR 
by following the process described in the first and the second steps. In a scenario where 
𝑘-anonymity and 𝑙-diversity are mixed, it is sufficient to generate a P-XAS that has a 
lower anonymity level than 𝑘-anonymity and 𝑙-diversity. For example, assume that 3-
anonymity and 3-diversity are permitted in P-XARs, and 4-diversity is requested by 
R-XAR. In this case, DAP generates the initial P-XAR by utilizing 3-anonymity. The 
DAP can generate any type of P-XAR by utilizing the initial P-XAR, according to the 
one-directional anonymization process.  
To enable the data transfer between these organizations, data providers and data users will 
utilize Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) if they transfer the data 
over the Internet. In the following discussions, four organizations are exhibited to clarify each 
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role. It is possible to merge some of them into a single organization. 
3.4 XML-based anonymization sheets 
In this study, XML-based Anonymization Sheets (XAS) as a format to define the rules and data 
descriptions is proposed. XAS is designed with reference to Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
because XML is a popular data format in organizations. For example, IEEE1888, which is used 
for communication of IoT devices, adopts XML as the data format. To distinguish the rules from 
the data, XML-based Anonymization Rule (XAR) is also proposed as a subset of XAS. XAS and 
XAR differ because XAR does not contain data as contents. Transactions in DTI4SFS utilize the 
XAS and its subset, XAR. Figure 3-3 lists an example of D-XAS. It includes the information to 
enable anonymization, including combinations of the sensitive attribute names and quasi-
identifiers, permitted anonymization methods and their levels, and data attributes such as created 
date, updated date and history, ownership, copyrights, comments, and others. Figure 3-4 lists 
an example of a P-XAR. It declares the required anonymization methods and their levels whereas 
it does not contain raw data. To enable generalizing processes such as masking, it can define the 
delimiter for distinguishing data sections. In this example, “BirthDay” is split using the ‘-’ 
character. During the anonymization process, the character is used to define the generalization 
boundary. If the data employs a general and standardized format, for example, BirthDay should 
  1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
  2 <?xml-anonymize type="text/xas" href="p-xar.xas"?> 
  3 <list> 
  4  <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
xmlns:v="http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#"> 
  5   <v:Kind rdf:about = "http://foo.com/me/hogehoge" > 
  6    <v:fn>Hoge Foo</v:fn> 
  7    <v:bday>1980-01-01</v:bday> 
  8    <v:hasTelephone> 
  9     <rdf:Description> 
10      <rdf:value>+81-45-566-1454</rdf:value> 
11      <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#Work"/> 
12      <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#Voice"/> 
13     </rdf:Description> 
14    </v:hasTelephone> 
15    <v:hasAddress> 
16     <rdf:Description> 
17      <v:street-address>123-45 Hoge Village</v:street-address> 
18      <v:locality>FooCity</v:locality> 
19      <v:postal-code>5555</v:postal-code> 
20      <v:country-name>Japan</v:country-name> 
21     </rdf:Description> 
22    </v:hasAddress> 
23   </v:Kind> 
24  </rdf:RDF> 
25  <OfficeScale>100ha</OfficeScale> 
26  <PowerConsumption>10kWh</PowerConsumption> 
27 
28  <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
xmlns:v="http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#"> 
29   <v:Kind rdf:about = "http://foo.com/me/db" > 
 
Figure 3-3 D-XAS example (extract) 
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be separated by ‘-,’ it can generalize the data entry by referring to the default rule. As an 
additional feature, the data provider can publish data without any data publishing limits such as 
anonymization by selecting “open attribute,” which was described in Section 3.1.1. This feature 
allows use cases such as a data provider publishes data samples to publicize the data’s availability. 
The secondary data user can request access to the open attributes by utilizing R-XAR. Figure 
3-5 lists an example of an R-XAR. If the secondary data consumer requests attribute identified 
  1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
  2 <anonymize> 
  3  <head> 
  4   <publishacceptance sensitive="divisional" quasi="divisional" /> 
  5   <firstdatasetposition> 
  6    <list> 
  7     <rdf:RDF /> 
  8    </list> 
  9   </firstdatasetposition> 
10   <sensitive type="k(>=3), l(>=2)"> 
11    <rdf:RDF> 
12     <v:Kind> 
13      <v:hasTelephone> 
14       <rdf:Description> 
15        <rdf:type number="2" /> 
16       </rdf:Description> 
17      </v:hasTelephone> 
18     </v:Kind> 
19    </rdf:RDF> 
20    <PowerConsumption /> 
21   </sensitive> 
22   <sensitive type="k(>=3), l(>=2)"> 
23    <OfficeScale /> 
24   </sensitive> 
25   <group name="addr" type="quasi" level="k(>=3), l(>=3)"/> 
26  </head> 
27  <rdf:RDF> 
28   <v:Kind> 
29    <v:fn note="Full Name" /> 
30    <v:bday note="BirthDay" type="quasi" level="k(>=2)" split="-" /> 
31    <v:hasTelephone> 
32     <rdf:Description> 
33      <rdf:value note="TelephoneNumber" type="open" split="\s" /> 
34      <rdf:type note="Number Type" attribute="rdf:resource" number="2" /> 
35     </rdf:Description> 
36    </v:hasTelephone> 
37    <v:hasAddress> 
38     <rdf:Description note="Addresses"> 
39      <v:street-address group="addr" priority="4" /> 
40      <v:locality group="addr" priority="3" /> 
41      <v:postal-code group="addr" priority="2" /> 
42      <v:country-name group="addr" priority="1" /> 
43     </rdf:Description> 
44    </v:hasAddress> 
45   </v:Kind> 
46  </rdf:RDF> 
47  <OfficeScale note="OfficeScale" /> 
48  <PowerConsumption type="open" note="PowerConsumption" /> 
49 </anonymize> 
 
Figure 3-4 P-XAR example 
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as quasi-identifiers, DAP publishes anonymized data that contains attributes calculated as quasi-
identifiers. The user also declares the required anonymization method, privacy protection level, 
sensitive attributes combinations, open attributes, and quasi-identifiers utilizing the R-XAR. 
The formats of XAS and its subset XAR utilize the Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) format and 
the Semantic Web standard. The XAS can be processed utilizing an XML schema, RDL schema, 
OWL method, and other related tools. 
3.5 Further studies for DTI4SFS 
DTI4SFS enables data sharing while preserving included private information by using 
anonymization. The core process of DTI4SFS is anonymization, and this tends to be a bottleneck 
of the entire process flow because the anonymization process contains iterative sub-process of a 
large amount of data. In this study, a hardware implementation of the anonymization process is 
proposed to enhance transaction ability of DTI4SFS. Namely, the hardware implementation 
suppresses the bottleneck to transact a large amount of data at high speed. Conventional studies 
have a drawback of information loss due to the implementation cost. The proposed method 
overcomes the problem. Detail of the conventional studies are discussed in Section 4.1. 
When focusing on the information value of shared data, change of the values in the data such 
  1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
  2 <anonymize type="k(3)"> 
  3  <head> 
  4   <sensitive> 
  5    <rdf:RDF> 
  6     <v:Kind> 
  7      <v:hasTelephone> 
  8       <rdf:Description> 
  9        <rdf:type number="2" /> 
10       </rdf:Description> 
11      </v:hasTelephone> 
12     </v:Kind> 
13    </rdf:RDF> 
14    <PowerConsumption /> 
15   </sensitive> 
16   <group name="addr" type="quasi" /> 
17  </head> 
18  <rdf:RDF> 
19   <v:Kind> 
20    <v:bday /> 
21    <v:hasTelephone> 
22     <rdf:Description> 
23      <rdf:value note="TelephoneNumber" type="quasi" /> 
24     </rdf:Description> 
25    </v:hasTelephone> 
26   </v:Kind> 
27  </rdf:RDF> 
28  <PowerConsumption note="PowerConsumption" /> 
29 </anonymize> 
 
Figure 3-5 R-XAR Example 
 
3  Data transaction infrastructure 
25 
 
 
as time-series data is important for some data users rather than data itself. For instance, when 
supposing control of electric power consumption, the transition of the electricity usage is 
important for the applications such as peak shift. In this study, an anonymization method to share 
time-series data while keeping the information of the transition is proposed. Since this method 
generates several patterns of the datasets, the number of the datasets which transition patterns 
of the values are similar to each other fulfills 𝑘-anonymity. In addition, this method is effective 
for load distribution of anonymization. Electricity usage data can be anonymized at the location 
close to all of the relevant data sources due to the regionality. Conventional approaches and 
these drawbacks are discussed in Section 5.1. The discussion shows the anonymization approach 
was not well studied so far. 
Another problem exists after data publishing to data users. DTI4SFS publishes according to 
the one-directional anonymization policy. Therefore, the same anonymized data are published to 
multiple data users who requested using the same R-XAR. The problem happens when one of the 
data users republishes the received data without any authorization (Figure 3-6). However, the 
malicious data user cannot be identified from the republished data since the published data are 
not unique each other. For solving this problem, in this study, a watermarking method for 
anonymized data is proposed. Watermarking is techniques to invisibly add information into data. 
If the proposed watermarking method adds information of the received data user, the malicious 
data user can be identified from the anonymized data republished by the malicious data user. The 
proposed method would be effective to suppress the unauthorized republishing. Conventional 
watermarking methods are not suitable to apply to anonymized data because anonymized data do 
not have particular order of the records whereas the conventional methods rely on order of 
records in the data. Additionally, modifications for the watermarking have to keep the anonymity 
of the data. Further discussion is shown at the beginning of Section 6. 
 
 
Figure 3-6 Unauthorized republishing in the proposed infrastructure 
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4 Hardware implementation of anonymizer 
DTI4SFS enables data sharing from data providers to data users while preserving private 
information in the data. As shown in Section 3.3, DTI4SFS can be divided into four organizations. 
Especially, DAP is the core organization in the proposed infrastructure. 
All data provided by data providers are anonymized in DAP for privacy preservation. 
Anonymization generalizes values in given data so that all records in the data are not unique 
enough. On the other hand, the anonymization process tends to be a bottleneck of the entire 
transaction due to its high calculation cost compared with the other process. This is because the 
sub-processes of the anonymization such as generalization of values and confirmation of the 
current status of privacy metrics are iterated while referring entire related records. If the 
anonymization process becomes faster, the bottleneck would be overcome. Moreover, thanks to 
the high throughput, the anonymization processor would enable to anonymize data at line speed. 
4.1 Existing studies and problem definition 
There have been numerous studies on anonymization models and software implementations of 
anonymizers, such as automatically detecting fields to anonymize and anonymizing time-series 
data [45] [46]. Contrastingly, the number of this kind of studies is very little when it comes to 
hardware implementation. There are some studies on utilizing Field Programmable Gate Arrays 
(FPGAs) for data mining. However, they do not consider the anonymity of the mined data [47] 
[48]. 
Sawada et al. proposed an FPGA-based anonymizer that utilizes Ternary Content Addressable 
Memory (TCAM) and caches to anonymize network data streams [49] [50]. TCAM is one of 
CAMs, which are special types of memory. General memories called Random Access Memory 
(RAM) return a stored data entry according to given address of the memory. In contrast to the 
RAM, a CAM returns a list of data entries which are matched to a given keyword. Especially, 
㼀CAM allows ‘0’, ‘1’, and ‘-’ (don’t care) to express data entries whereas data entries of 
general CAMs are expressed by ‘0’ and ‘1’ only. Therefore, TCAM is suitable for anonymization 
using masking by using ‘-’ as a mask of anonymization. Additionally, TCAM enables single-cycle 
data table lookup. Hence, it is an ideal memory for anonymizers, which require frequent data 
lookups. The study of Sawada et al. showed enough throughput for high-speed networks over 
1GbE, but its largest disadvantage is the use of TCAM memory. 
The disadvantage of using TCAM is its high circuit implementation cost. When TCAMs are 
used for anonymizers on FPGAs, their processing window size becomes smaller because of the 
large circuit utilization. Since anonymization is performed within the processing window, larger 
window sizes will reduce the information loss ratio during anonymization. Therefore, TCAM-
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based anonymizers tend to have higher information loss due to the limit of window size. 
This section focuses on addressing this problem by proposing an anonymizer that has a large 
window size and a small enough circuit size for implementation on a mid-range FPGA device. 
Being implementable on a mid-range FPGA brings benefits, such as cost-effectiveness and 
availability. These benefits are important when considering implementation cost of DAP because 
if the implementation cost becomes lower, the anonymization process can be distributed to 
produce further high-throughput anonymization. For the distribution, allocating the proposed 
anonymizer on a network device is appropriate because it is rational that data provided by data 
providers are anonymized while the data are sent through the network in DTI4SFS. Additionally, 
it is useful for data providers who want to anonymize data before providing the data to DTI4SFS. 
This pre-anonymization would reduce load of anonymization process at DTI4SFS. For these 
reasons, this study supposes that the proposed anonymizer is implemented on a network device. 
For the use case of the proposed anonymizer, an anonymization of LAN traffics such as public 
network at event sites and public facilities while capturing the traffics at the gateway of the LAN 
is supposed. In the use case, the network traffics can be analyzed to survey Internet usage. The 
required throughput in the networks is generally 10Gbps or at least 1Gbps. The proposed 
anonymizer aims to overcome the throughput. 
4.2 Proposed architecture 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, most existing studies on hardware-based anonymizers rely on 
TCAM and thus result in high implementation costs. For example, the maximum window size 
possible on a Virtex-5 XC5VLX330T FPGA device is merely 256 despite the fact that the FPGA 
has the largest circuit area in its class. Implementing the TCAM-based architecture on dedicated 
Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) circuits will allow larger window size and improve 
the performance. However, the cost for producing such circuits for low-volume products, such 
as internet routers, will increase drastically. 
Given these limitations, it is ideal to implement the anonymizer on an FPGA-device to lower 
the cost and allow flexibility. For maintaining the information loss ratio at a low level and to make 
the circuit small enough for FPGAs, in this study, a RAM-based anonymizer is proposed. The 
use of RAM will lower the circuit utilization and, therefore, increase the window size and lower 
the information loss ratio. 
4.2.1 Overview of the proposed architecture 
The architecture of the proposed anonymizer is illustrated in Figure 4-1. The main components 
of the anonymizer are the controller, data generator, RAM, buffer, Bloom filter, and hash modules. 
The controller manages anonymization process while the data generator generates values to 
update anonymization status. The generated values are sent to the RAM via the buffer. The 
buffer is also used to store a tuple in the processing window one by one. The use of RAM is what 
distinguishes this anonymizer from existing ones. Hashing is used for addressing the memory to 
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enable fast lookups using the RAM. The Bloom filter is used to check whether each q*-block 
fulfills required 𝑙-diversity. 
The proposed anonymizer adopts masking described in Section 2.1.4 as the generalization 
technique. IP address was set to the quasi-identifier for the evaluation to compare with the 
implementation using TCAM. 
4.2.2 RAM and buffer 
The RAM and buffer memory used for the anonymizer is a distributed RAM, which is directly 
implemented on the FPGA logic. Distributed RAM was chosen for this anonymizer for its 
asynchronous read capability. Asynchronous read allows for faster table lookups and, therefore, 
improve the overall throughput of the anonymizer. 
The data fields of the RAM and buffer memory are shown in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, 
respectively. The “data” field holds the original data that was transferred to the anonymizer for 
the anonymization process. This 64-bit field holds both the quasi-identifier and the sensitive 
attribute. The allocation of the quasi-identifier and the sensitive attribute can be adjusted by 
sending commands to the anonymizer, which will be explained in Section 4.2.3. The “k_count” 
and “l_count” fields hold the anonymity levels of the corresponding tuple. The “mask” field holds 
the number of bits of the quasi-identifiers that have been generalized. Table 4-3 explains 
examples of the masking. 㼀he “㻿E㼀_㻿EP” in this table is the command to set the allocation of 
the quasi-identifier and the sensitive attribute. The value of SET_SEP represents the number of 
 
Figure 4-1 Architecture of the proposed anonymizer 
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bits of the part of the sensitive attribute from the rightmost bit in the data field. The mask field 
represents the number of masked bits from the rightmost bit of the quasi-identifier part. 
Therefore, the “quasi-identifier” field is the masked version of the data field masked from the 
rightmost bit that a number of the masked bits is the sum of the SET_SEP and mask fields. The 
“status” and “parity” bits hold the current status of the anonymization process. The status field 
represents whether the anonymization process is finished or not. The parity field represents 
whether the data entry is valid or not. The use of the parity field omits initialization process of 
the RAM at every cycle of anonymization.  
4.2.3 Controller 
The controller is a state machine to manage the anonymization process of the anonymizer. The 
controller state serves as the control signal for the other modules of the anonymizer. Other 
modules in the anonymizer, such as the data_generator and Bloom filter, change their function 
according to the status of the controller. 
The controller also serves as the access controller for interfacing the anonymizer from external 
components. It receives the dataset to be anonymized and sends back the mask data as output. 
It also receives the command signals and adjusts the window size, 𝑘-anonymity, 𝑙-diversity, and 
separation parameters. The list and description of the commands are shown in Table 4-4. 
Requirements of 𝑘-anonymity and 𝑙-diversity are set by the “㻿E㼀_K” and “㻿E㼀_L” command. 
The SET_SEP command is used to define the allocation of the quasi-identifier and sensitive 
attribute as described in Section 4.2.2. 㼀he “㻿E㼀_W” command is used to define the processing 
Table 4-1 Data fields of RAM 
Bits Field 
[123:120] parity 
[119:56] quasi-identifier 
[55:54] status 
[53:48] mask 
[47:40] k_count 
[39:32] l_count 
[31:0] bloom filter register (bf_reg) 
 
Table 4-2 Data fields of buffer 
Bits Field 
[71:8] data 
[7:6] status 
[5:0] mask 
 
Table 4-3 Example of masking in the proposed anonymizer 
SET_SEP mask data quasi-identifier 
2 1 00110000 00110*** 
2 3 00110000 001***** 
4 2 00110000 00****** 
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window size. 㼀he “DA㼀A” command is used to send dataset to be anonymized. The start and 
end of importing the data is controlled by the “DA㼀A_㻿” and “DA㼀A_E” commands, respectively. 
The controller sends status information of the anonymizer to the external components. The 
“status_an” and “sts_out” signals in Figure 4-1 exports status information of the anonymizer and 
data output, respectively. Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 show further information of the values sent 
from the two signals. 
4.2.4 Data generator 
The data_generator composes the signal generated by the RAM, buffer, and Bloom filter 
modules and generates a new entry for the RAM data table. The data_generator analyzes the 
contents of the RAM, buffer, and Bloom filter outputs and perform the necessary operation for 
each state of the anonymization process. The operation includes calculations of values to update 
the k_count, l_count, mask, and status fields. Details of this data maneuver are explained in 
Section 4.3. 
Table 4-4 Controller commands 
Value Name Description 
0x00 IDEL Idle State. Do nothing. 
0x01 SET_K Set the 𝑘-anonymity target. 
0x02 SET_L Set the 𝑙-diversity target. 
0x03 SET_SEP Set the separating point of quasi-identifier and sensitive attribute on the data_bus. 
0x04 SET_W Set the window size. 
0x05 DATA_S Start of dataset. 
0x06 DATA Input data. 
0x07 DATA_E End of dataset. 
 
Table 4-5 Values of status_an bus and their descriptions 
Value Name Field 
0x0 RSV Reserved. 
0x1 READY Ready state. Ready for commands. 
0x2 BUSY Busy state. Do not send additional commands. 
0x3 ERROR Error. 
 
Table 4-6 Values of sts_out bus and their descriptions 
Value Name Field 
0x0 IDLE Idle state. No data output. 
0x1 DATA_S Beginning of output data. 
0x2 DATA Output data. 
0x3 DATA_E End of output data. 
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4.2.5 Hash 
The anonymizer uses a technique called hashing for addressing the memory for data lookup. 
Hashing generates a hash value from the data, and the hash value is used as the address of the 
memory where the data will be stored. This hashing function enables very quick table lookups 
since hash value calculation is the only necessary operation.  
While the use of hashing for data lookup brings many benefits, including faster operation and 
lower circuit utilization, a hash collision cannot be avoided. Yamaguchi et al. [51] evaluated the 
hash collision rates and the hardware performances of different hash functions under network 
workloads. According to the evaluation in the study, a hash collision rate depends on the property 
of data to be hashed. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the best hash function in terms of hash 
collision rate. Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) [52] was selected as the hash function for the 
proposed architecture since it has the smallest delay.  
The hash function used for the proposed design is a CRC32 with a polynomial 4-1. Of the 32-
bit hash value, 𝑛 lower significant bits are used as the memory address. 𝑛 is the number of binary 
digits necessary to address the entire processing window. For example, for a window size of 4096, 
𝑛 = log2 4096 = 12. 
 𝑥32 + 𝑥26 + 𝑥23 + 𝑥22 + 𝑥16 + 𝑥12 + 𝑥11 + 𝑥10 + 𝑥8 + 𝑥7 + 𝑥5 + 𝑥4 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥 + 1 
  4-1 
4.2.6 Bloom filter 
The use of the Bloom filter also makes the proposed design unique over previous designs. The 
Bloom filter is a data structure that allows fast query of the members of a dataset [53]. The Bloom 
filter is appropriate for the proposed anonymizer in two aspects. One of the aspects is 
implementation cost. The Bloom filter consists of bit arrays and hash functions only. Hence, the 
Bloom filter requires little implementation cost. The other aspect is a small delay. The Bloom 
filter processes at low latency because the Bloom filter registers and refers data by hashing and 
logical operations only. The bloom filter runs at a single cycle in the hardware implementation. 
The anonymizer adopts the Bloom filter to verify whether the tuples in the data have met 𝑙-
diversity. To verify 𝑙-diversity, how many types of sensitive attributes exist in each q*-block 
must be counted. When a new tuple is added to a q*-block, the Bloom filter is used to check 
whether the sensitive attribute in the new tuple already exist in the q*-block or not. The Bloom 
filter returns true when the sensitive attribute exists. The relevant l_count field is counted up 
when the Bloom filter returns false. 
The Bloom filter requires two hash functions. In this study, CRC32 with the polynomial 4-1 
with different initial values are used for both of the two functions. 㼀he “bloom filter register 
(bf_reg)” field in the RAM holds the 32-bit string for the Bloom filter. The bf_reg contains the 
sensitive attribute of the q*-block. 
Using the Bloom filter rarely makes false positive because the Bloom filter uses hash functions. 
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When the false positive happens, the Bloom filter returns true even though the sensitive attribute 
does not exist in the q*-block. Fortunately, the false positive is acceptable regarding privacy 
preservation because the false positive promotes further anonymization. Although the false 
positive increases information loss, the anonymizer adopts the Bloom filter to reduce the circuit 
implementation cost whereas the false positive is allowed. 
4.3 Details of the anonymization process 
The fundamental functionality of the proposed anonymizer is to receive datasets that require 
anonymization and determine the mask length of the quasi-identifier field for each tuple in the 
dataset. The entire process can be divided into the following procedures: command and data 
reception, anonymization, and data output. 
In the command and data reception state, the anonymizer accepts commands and data form 
external devices. Next, the anonymization process is continued until all tuples in the dataset 
achieve the requested anonymity levels. When the anonymization process finishes, the mask bits 
are sent out from the output bus. 
4.3.1 State transition 
The state diagram of the controller is illustrated in Figure 4-2. There is a total of 5 states in 
the controller. State0 and 1 correspond to the command and data reception, state2, and 3 
 
Figure 4-2 State diagram of the controller 
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anonymizations, and state4 data output. 
State0 is the initial state of the anonymizer, and servers as the idle point until a new 
anonymization task is started. When there are incoming commands, the necessary data 
maneuvers are performed accordingly. When the “DA㼀A_㻿” command, which marks the beginning 
of a new dataset, is received, the controller moves its state to state1. The incoming data is stored 
in the Buffer until the controller receives the “DA㼀A_E” command. 㼀his command moves the 
state to state2. 
State2 and 3 are the two states in which the actual anonymization is performed. The 
anonymization process is divided into two cycles: cycle1 and cycle2. The procedures of each 
cycle are repeated until it reaches the end of the processing window, and in cycle1, the state 
transit to cycle2. In cycle2, the state continues to state4 if all tuples have achieved anonymity, 
and if not, the state moves back to state2 (cycle1). 
State4 sends the mask bits from the output bus. When the mask data for the entire dataset is 
sent out, the state moves back to state0 and waits for commands and new data. 
4.3.2 Anonymization process 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the anonymization process is divided into two steps: cycle1 
and cycle2. Pseudo code for the anonymization process is given in Figure 4-3. 
4.3.2.1 Anonymization Cycle1 
The first process of cycle1 is to determine if a tuple with the same quasi-identifier has appeared 
earlier. Every tuple in the buffer is sequentially read, and a hash value is generated for RAM table 
lookup. Since this value is used as the address of the RAM, tuples with the same quasi-identifier 
correspond to the same memory address. Therefore, each entry in the RAM represents a q*-
block. Therefore, if the RAM entry for the tuple has a valid entry, this means that the tuple with 
the same quasi-identifier has appeared at least once within the same processing window. This is 
true if the hash collisions do not occur. Unfortunately, the hash collision does occur. For the 
proposed architecture, hash collision is detected by comparing the quasi-identifier entry of both 
RAM and buffer. If both entries match each other, the RAM entry is valid, and the k_count field 
is incremented to show that this q*-block has one more member. If the values do not match, this 
indicates a hash collision, and the quasi-identifier of both tuples are masked entirely to preserve 
data privacy. 
The next process of cycle1 is to determine the 𝑙-diversity level. The 𝑙-diversity level is 
increased if the sensitive attribute of the tuple has not appeared in the same q*-block. As 
mentioned in Section 4.2.6, the Bloom filter is utilized to test the existence of a tuple with the 
same sensitive attribute within the q*-block. Every RAM entry, i.e. q,*-block, holds a 32bit 
bf_reg field, which is used as the Bloom filter register. Each time a sensitive attribute is tested, 
the bf_reg is read by the Bloom filter and tested. If the membership is true, this indicates that a 
tuple with the same attribute has appeared previously, and the 𝑙-diversity level stays the same. 
If false, there are no tuple within the q*-block that has the same sensitive attribute, and the 𝑙-
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diversity level is advanced by incrementing the l_count value. 
4.3.2.2 Anonymization cycle2 
Cycle2 determines the anonymity level of each tuple and performs the necessary operations. 
The anonymity level of each tuple is stored in the k_count and l_count fields of the RAM entry 
corresponding to each tuple’s q*-block. If both 𝑘-anonymity and 𝑙-diversity levels reach the 
requested anonymity level, the tuple’s status entry in the buffer is updated to the finished status. 
If the anonymity levels are not met, the mask bit is incremented and stored into the buffer. Tuples 
with mask value, which has reached the value that would mask the entire quasi-identifier, is also 
marked as finished. As these tasks are performed, the anonymizer checks whether all tuples have 
while anonymization not finished do 
case cycle 1 
for each tuple in window do 
if new tuple then 
add sensitive attribute of tuple to bloomfilter 
k_count ← 1 
l_count ← 1 
end if 
else if not new tuple then 
k_count ++ 
if bloomfilter member test = false then 
l_count ++ 
end if 
end else if 
end for 
goto cycle2 
end case 
case cycle 2 
for each tuple in window do 
if k_count >= k_target && l_count >= l_target 
state = finished 
end if 
else 
mask++ 
end else 
end for 
if all state = finished then 
exit anonymization loop 
end if 
goto cycle1 
end case 
end while 
 
Figure 4-3 Pseudo code for the anonymization process 
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achieved anonymity by placing a flag bit which turns low once a non-finished tuple appears; when 
all tuples meet anonymity requirements, the flag bit remains high. If the flag bit remains high at 
the end of cycle2, the anonymizer exits the anonymization loop to proceeds to the data output. 
4.4 Evaluation of the anonymizer 
The performance of the anonymizer was measured by the following three metrics: information 
loss, throughput, and circuit size. The information loss ratio is measured to determine the data 
retention rate after anonymization. Throughput evaluations show how fast the anonymizer is 
capable of anonymizing datasets. Lastly, the circuit size is evaluated to compare the 
implementation cost of the two designs. 
For a fair comparison of the proposed anonymizer with the TCAM-based anonymizer, the 
proposed architecture was modified to make the two designs have the same functionality. The 
following are the modifications applied to the proposed architecture. 
y Data input to the anonymizer regarding both quasi-identifier and sensitive attribute was 
fixed to 32 bits, respectively. The capability of modifying the assignment of quasi-identifier 
and sensitive attribute on the data bus does not exist on the TCAM architecture. 
Therefore, this functionality was omitted from the proposed architecture for evaluation. 
y The command receiver functionality to set window size and anonymity parameters was 
removed. 
y Data fields of RAM that are no longer necessary as a result of the design changes above 
was modified. The parity field was deleted, and the quasi-identifier field was shrunk to 32 
bits. 
4.4.1 Information loss ratio 
The information loss ratio was measured to analyze how much data is retained after an 
anonymization process. Lower information loss ratio retains more data. Therefore, reducing 
information loss ratio would be more beneficial for the data users. To evaluate the anonymizer 
for network application usage, the workload used for the analysis was the source IP address, and 
the URL of HTTP GET requests of a laboratory office network. The network consists of 
approximately 100 clients, and the workload contains a total of around 20,000 requests. A 
software-based simulator for the RAM and TCAM anonymizers was used for this evaluation. 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 show the relationship between information loss ratio and the window 
size of four patterns of 𝑙-diversities regarding TCAM and RAM anonymizers, respectively. 
According to the two figures, the information loss ratio decreases when the window size becomes 
larger. This is because large window size provides a large number of candidates of tuples to create 
a q*-block without masking. The two figures also represent the relationship between the required 
anonymity level and the information loss ratio. The information loss ratio becomes larger when 
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the large value of anonymity level is required. 
Another type of comparisons regarding the information loss ratio of the TCAM and RAM 
anonymizers are given in Figure 4-6 to Figure 4-9. The two architectures are compared at 
different 𝑘-anonymity and 𝑙-diversity requirements. The dotted line shows the information loss 
ratio of the TCAM anonymizer when the window size is 256. This value is important since 256 is 
the maximum window size that Virtes-5 XC5VLX330T can accommodate. 
From the results, it is clear that TCAM architecture has lower information loss ratios in any 
anonymity level when the window size is the same compared with the RAM architecture. The 
 
Figure 4-4 Relationship between information loss ratio and the window size 
 of four patterns of 𝑙-diversities (TCAM) 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Relationship between information loss ratio and the window size 
 of four patterns of 𝑙-diversities (RAM) 
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RAM architecture has a larger information loss ratio for two reasons. The first reason is a hash 
collision. When a hash collision occurs, the entire quasi-identifier is masked to prevent anonymity 
shortfalls. This masking is the result of using hashing for table lookup and was not an issue for 
TCAM anonymizers. 
The second reason is the false-positive error caused by the Bloom filter. A false-positive error 
of the Bloom filter results in the anonymizer determining that the 𝑙-diversity level is lower than 
actual; a positive result from the Bloom filter implies that the tuple with the same sensitive 
attribute exist within the q*-block and that the 𝑙-diversity level is not increased. This false-
positive error is not a problem for the anonymity level but has effects on the information loss 
ratio since the 𝑙-diversity level is determined to be lower than the actual and the mask bits are 
increased more than necessary. 
Although the RAM architecture has a larger information loss ratio when the window size is the 
same, the ratio decreases enough that the levels go under those of TCAM at 256. When the 
window size was 1,024 or larger, evaluations under all anonymity levels showed less information 
loss than TCAM at 256. Since the RAM has a significantly less circuit utilization, the window size 
can be further extended when embedded on the same FPGA device. Further analysis of the circuit 
 
Figure 4-6 Information loss ratio (𝑘 = 2, 𝑙 = 2) 
 
 
Figure 4-7 Information loss ratio (𝑘 = 5, 𝑙 = 5) 
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size evaluation is shown in Section 4.4.2. 
Another characteristic is that at window sizes over 4,096, the decrease in the information is 
very small. For example, the information loss ratio was reduced only by only 1.5% from window 
size of 4,096 to 16,384. 
4.4.2 Circuit size 
The circuit size evaluation was performed to analyze the circuit size of the two designs. Smaller 
circuit size is beneficial, as it will lower implementation costs. Circuit size was evaluated by 
comparing the resource utilization rates when implemented on an FPGA device. The target FPGA 
device was Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VLX330T. Cadence NC-Verilog and Simvision 06.20 were used 
for circuit simulation, and ISE Design Suite 14.2 was used for synthesis and implementation. 
The window size of the TCAM-based anonymizer was set at 256 tuples since it is the largest 
size that the FPGA can accommodate. For the RAM-based anonymizer, the circuit size 
evaluation was done with a window size of 256, 512, 1,024, 2,048, and 4,096. Table 4-7 shows 
the FPGA device utilization summary. 
 
Figure 4-8 Information loss ratio (𝑘 = 10, 𝑙 = 10) 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Information loss ratio (𝑘 = 20, 𝑙 = 20) 
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The device utilization of Table 4-7 shows that the RAM architecture has lower circuit 
utilization under any window size configuration. Results in Section 4.4.1 have shown that the 
RAM architecture achieves lower information loss rates than the TCAM architecture when the 
window size is larger than 1,024. When the slice LUT utilization of the RAM and TCAM 
architectures with the same configurations are compared, the RAM architecture had an 82.3% 
reduction. Even when the window size was at 4,096, RAM architecture had 39.5% lower utilization. 
4.4.3 Throughput 
The throughput of the anonymizer was evaluated with two metrics that are maximum frequency 
and tuples/second. The maximum frequency of the circuit shows how fast the circuit is capable 
of being operated. The device setup used for this evaluation is the same as those for circuit size 
evaluation. The maximum frequencies of the RAM and TCAM designs are 105 MHz and 70 MHz, 
respectively. 
Although the RAM architecture has a higher operating frequency than the TCAM architecture, 
it does not necessarily mean that the RAM architecture has a higher throughput. The two 
anonymizers have different anonymization procedures, and the necessary clock cycle for 
completion is different. An original simulator was used to evaluate the actual throughput using 
real-life traffic. The simulator emulates the anonymization sequence of the TCAM and RAM-
based anonymizers and measures the necessary clock counts for the entire anonymization process. 
Network traces with 20,000 HTTP requests were used as the workload. After the clock counts 
were obtained, the number of tuples each anonymizer is capable of handling per second at its 
maximum frequency was calculated. 
The throughput of a software anonymizer was also evaluated for comparison. The evaluation 
was done on a Linux server with dual 2.9 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2690 processor and 128 GB DDR3 
memory. 
Table 4-7 Circuit utilization 
 Number of Slice Registers 
(out of 207360) 
Number of Slice LUTs 
(out of 207360) Number used as Logic (out of 207360) 
Number used as Memory 
(out of 54720) 
TCAM 
(256) 3733 (0%) 
42550 
(20%) 
9526 
(4%) 
33024 
(60%) 
RAM 
(256) 129 (0%) 
2989 
(1%) 
1597 
(0%) 
1392 
(2%) 
RAM 
(512) 130 (0%) 
4482 
(2%) 
1698 
(0%) 
2784 
(5%) 
RAM 
(1024) 128 (0%) 
7528 
(3%) 
1960 
(0%) 
5568 
(10%) 
RAM 
(2048) 128 (0%) 
13546 
(6%) 
2410 
(1%) 
11136 
(20%) 
RAM 
(4096) 128 (0%) 
25739 
(12%) 
3467 
(1%) 
22272 
(40%) 
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Figure 4-10 shows the results of the evaluation. The RAM architecture has a maximum 
throughput of 1.61M tuples/sec and had a 34% to 90% increase in throughput over the TCAM 
architecture, and when compared to the software implementation, the throughput improvement 
was 380 to 440x. Compared to the software anonymizer, parallelization of hash calculation, Bloom 
filter query/add, and data maneuvers contributed to increasing the throughput of hardware 
anonymizers. 
When considering an application where portions of the network traffic are anonymized, the 
anonymizer does not have to anonymize the entire network workload. For example, in case where 
a single set of quasi-identifier and sensitive attribute (e.g. IP address and URL) is the subject for 
anonymization for every packet in a network with an average packet size of 1,000 bytes, the RAM 
architecture will be able to anonymize the IP and URL of network with bandwidth of up to 1.61M 
(tuples/sec) × 1,000(bytes/packet) × 8 = 12.9Gbps. This is enough throughput to anonymize 
contents of 10GbE and OC192 speed networks on the fly whereas the throughput of the software 
implementation is less than 1Gbps. 
4.5 FPGA implementation 
Based on the results of the evaluation, a RAM architecture with a window size of 4,096 was 
chosen for the final implementation on FPGA. The FPGA used for the implementation was Xilinx 
KC705 Kintex-7 evaluation board with XC7K325T-2FFG900C device onboard (Figure 4-11). 
Vivado 2014.2 was used for synthesis and implementation. In addition to the proposed anonymizer, 
 
Figure 4-10 Throughput of the anonymizers 
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the inserter module was implemented into the FPGA to insert data to the anonymizer for testing. 
XM105 debug card, and a logic analyzer was used to observe the output. The circuit size and 
the maximum operating frequency of the implemented anonymizer are given in Table 4-8. 
Circuit utilization and maximum frequency for the implemented design is inferior to those of 
Section 4.4. This is the result of stripping off some functionality for evaluation. This increase in 
circuit utilization and decreased maximum frequency would have been evident if the additional 
functionality were added to the TCAM architecture. The implemented design has a maximum 
throughput of 8.75Gbps, which is 68% of the throughput calculated for the result in Section 4.4.3. 
The throughput of the implemented design is enough to anonymize 1GbE networks that are the 
supposed use cases mentioned in Section 4.1 whereas the throughput of the software 
implementation is not enough. Although the throughput of the implemented design is less than 
10Gbps, the proposed anonymizer would overcome the throughput when the anonymizer is 
implemented on either a more high-performance FPGA or an ASIC. Additionally, the throughput 
of the implemented design is a little short of OC192 but enough for OC48. 
4.6 Summary 
In this section, a RAM-based anonymizer was proposed and implemented on an FPGA for data 
anonymization for DTI4SFS. Hashing and Bloom filters were utilized to effectively anonymize 
datasets while retaining throughput and lowering the circuit utilization cost. The proposed 
anonymizer showed 82.3% reduction in circuit size compared to existing anonymizer based on 
TCAM. The maximum throughput of the anonymizer was 8.75Gbps, which is enough for 1GbE 
and multiple OC48 speed networks. 
 
Figure 4-11 Xilinx KC705 Kintex-7 evaluation board with FPGA 
 
Table 4-8 Implementation results 
Number of Slice Registers 124 (0%) 
Number of Slice LUTs 39973 (19%) 
Number used as Logic 13861 (7%) 
Number used as Memory 26112 (41%) 
Maximum Frequency 71.3 MHz 
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5 Anonymization method to share electricity 
usage data 
As described in Section 2.1.4, anonymization generally modifies values in data until the data 
does not contain unique tuples. However, this kind of anonymization methods is sometimes not 
appropriate for some data types. Time-series data such as sensor data are categorized to the 
data types. 
A time-series data table represents a change of the values, i.e. data transition. The tuples in 
the time-series data table consist of a combination of a timestamp and values related to the time. 
Therefore, data users utilize time-series data to know the information about how the values 
change rather than the information about values themselves in each tuple. Accordingly, the 
general anonymization methods described in the previous paragraph do not suit the time-series 
data. For instance, when anonymizing the time-series data using the general anonymization 
method, timestamps could be generalized to create q*-blocks. This anonymization would spoil 
the information of the rapid change of values. Here is another example of the situation that the 
q*-block consists of tuples of the same timestamp by mixing multiple time-series data tables. 
This example would also ruin the information of the transition. There is another concern from the 
aspect of privacy preservation. The concern is that a q*-block that consists of tuples related to 
a single individual could be generated. Such anonymized data still contains unique information. 
These problems can be solved if the single time-series data table is regarded as the unit of 
anonymization like a tuple in a data table in the general anonymization methods. In other words, 
𝑘-anonymity is achieved when time-series data tables are classified to some groups while each 
of the groups has 𝑘 of the time-series data tables at least. The classification result shows the 
information of the change of the values for each of the groups. In addition, the result does not 
contain any group related to a single individual only. If such anonymization method exists, the 
proposed infrastructure can anonymize time-series data while keeping the data quality required 
by the data users. 
This study proposes an anonymization method to share time-series data while supposing data 
sharing in smart cities. Smart city is a city that effectively controls infrastructures related to 
cities to provide convenient and comfortable life. The smart city has a smart grid that is one of 
the electric grids, which provides electricity from power suppliers to consumers. Smart grids are 
different to conventional electric grids because smart grids allow intercommunication between 
the suppliers and the consumers. Smart meters are used in smart grids instead of conventional 
power meters for the intercommunication. Smart meters are installed as essential devices for 
smart houses and home energy management systems. It allows power suppliers to acquire the 
electricity usage of the target household as electricity usage data. Analysis of the acquired data 
renders smarter services from power suppliers. For instance, the total amount of used electricity 
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during peak times would be reduced by shifting the peak electricity usage in each household. The 
technique to adjust the electricity bill for electricity usage control is referred to as a demand 
response (DR). The DR service is used to cut or shift the peak electricity usage to maintain the 
demand-supply balance at a period. However, when the company under contract only captures 
the smart meter data, it becomes difficult to manage the fine DR service in the target region. 
This is because all power companies in the region cannot share the usage data for achieving the 
electricity usage control of each household, considering the amount of lifestyle information 
acquired by the history of electricity usage data from the perspective of privacy preserving and 
data monopolism of companies. 
Privacy preservation of households must be well considered when the data are shared to 
analyze electricity usage through DTI4SFS. Data analysts may recognize what types of electrical 
appliances were operated at a specific time and by which household. Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 
show example results of the analyses [54] [55]. These analyzing results represent that electricity 
usage data contain lifestyle of the households. This technique is known as Non-Intrusive 
(Appliance) Load Monitoring [56] [57]. This information would be useful for criminals; for instance, 
a thief could estimate the family structure and reduce the risk of meeting the people who are 
living in the target’s household [58]. 
In this section, an anonymization method to share electricity usage while preserving data 
privacy is proposed. The method consists of a Self-Organizing Map (SOM) [59] for the 
anonymization. The proposed method was evaluated using two types of data captured from smart 
meters in different smart grids. The proposed method is adaptable in sharing any type of data 
while adjusting a special variable to maintain data accuracy according to the relevant analyses. 
Additionally, the proposed method can reduce information loss compared to another conventional 
method that anonymizes the data of each power supplier without data sharing. 
 
Figure 5-1 Electricity usage disclosed from electricity usage data (1) [54] 
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In the supposed situation in this section, power suppliers are both data providers and data 
users of DTI4SFS while privacy information is related to households of the power suppliers. 
Publishing rules for the data sharing would be written by each power supplier while considering 
opinions from the households. Figure 5-3 shows the overview of the situation. 
 
Figure 5-2 Electricity usage disclosed from electricity usage data (2) [55] 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Overview of supposed situation in Section 5 
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5.1 Conventional approaches of PPDM for smart cities 
There are some PPDM approaches to utilize electricity usage data while preserving data 
privacy as follows. 
5.1.1 Approach based on homomorphic encryption 
Homomorphic encryption is an approach of sharing data as mentioned in Section 2.1.1. This 
method provides encrypted calculation results without revealing the concerning values and 
equations. However, this approach requires high calculation costs. Moreover, the cost to manage 
encryption keys would be high when many smart meters are used. Guan et al. proposed a method 
to aggregate electricity usage data from smart meters in a smart grid using homomorphic 
encryption [60]. The method proposes a control center that is allowed to obtain the aggregated 
electricity usage data. The control center must pay a higher cost to use homomorphic encryption 
and to manage the encryption keys. Even if the costs are acceptable, several problems still exist 
for the DR services. The first problem is the data aggregation process. The control center in 
Guan’s system cannot obtain any type of individual smart meter data, such as a pattern or cluster, 
by classification. This feature makes it difficult to issue the appropriate control commands to 
each household. Furthermore, the method does not allow the sharing of electricity usage data 
among power suppliers and others. 
5.1.2 Perturbation based approach 
Another approach is by randomizing values, i.e. perturbation as mentioned in Section 2.1.2. 
This approach replaces values in the data with alternative values to prevent disclosing the original 
value. The alternative values are generated by adding noise to the original values, or by randomly 
selecting other records in the data. A data user uses the data while estimating the original value 
using statistic methods [61]. Although this approach has an advantage in its wide application for 
various types of data, it lacks in preserving privacy because the original data can be estimated. 
Kursawe et al. propose some protocols to aggregate data in smart grids while preserving data 
privacy [62]. In this protocol, data providers add noise to data before the aggregation, and the 
aggregator obtains the sum of electricity usage by subtracting the noise. However, the aggregator 
only obtains the sum of the data [60]. 
5.1.3 Anonymization based approach 
Anonymization generalizes the unique record to prevent the identification of the corresponding 
data and to preserve the privacy as described in Section 2.1.4, 2.2, and 2.3. 𝑘-member clustering 
is one of the anonymization algorithms of data clustering [63]. It creates clusters of similar records 
by generalizing records. This generalization maintains the number of records of each cluster 
greater than or equal to 𝑘. Subsequently, values in the same cluster are replaced with common 
values to satisfy the 𝑘-anonymity. If the anonymization result holds the information about the 
electricity usage, 𝑘-member clustering would be suitable to share electricity usage data. 
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5.2 Requirements for the anonymization 
There is a problem to use 𝑘-member clustering to anonymize electricity usage data. The 
problem is that how to convert electricity usage data to the appropriate form for the 𝑘-member 
clustering while keeping data quality required by data users. Namely, a data clustering method 
to classify time-series data according to the data patterns is required. 
Additionaly, it is better if the data clustering method does not require a high-performance 
calculation environment. Since electricity usage data have locality, the anonymization does not 
need to be processed at the center of the proposed infrastructure. In other words, the 
anonymization process of the electricity usage data can be done in each area. Therefore, it is 
better if the clustering method can work on normal computers such as desktop machines or 
network appliances that any accelerating system for the calculation is not attached. This study 
adopts SOM for the clustering of the time-series data to fulfill their requirements. 
5.3 Self-organizing map (SOM) 
SOM is one of the unsupervised machine learning techniques based on artificial neural network 
and known as a clustering algorithm of time-series data [64]. Unsupervised machine learning 
techniques do not require training data whereas supervised machine learning techniques require 
the training data. The training data are referred by supervised machine learning techniques in the 
training step to learn how to correctly classify data. In contrast, unsupervised machine learning 
techniques enhance their accuracy of the classification or clustering by other methods such as 
iteration of their clustering step. For electricity usage data, unsupervised machine learning is 
appropriate due to difficulty of preparing the training data. In the other words, it is difficult to 
prepare the training data that clearly show the answer of the classification because there are 
many data patterns of electricity usage and the households change the patterns frequently. Each 
power supplier is only required to prepare the relevant electricity usage data. 
SOM maps multidimensional records into two-dimensional nodes, which is called a map [59] 
(Figure 5-4). This feature reduces calculation cost after SOM, which means 𝑘-member clustering, 
because 𝑘-member clustering contains the repeated calculation step of the distances between 
the records. When applying SOM to electricity usage data, each component in the records holds 
electricity usage at the related timestamp. Since SOM creates clusters of given electricity usage 
data based on their data patterns, SOM can create the clusters while keeping information of the 
change of the electricity usage. In addition, the SOM allows the use of any number of record 
dimensions, although all records must be of the same number of dimensions, i.e., the SOM is 
executable for any electricity usage data if all data are acquired in the same period. Furthermore, 
the SOM does not require the number of clusters or the number of records in each cluster. It 
can ignore the size of the record of each power supplier for data sharing, and this is its unique 
and superior feature [65]. 
SOM can be divided into two phases as follows. First, a SOM randomly fills the node weight 
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vectors of nodes in a map as initial values. The learning phase repeatedly proceeds the two-step 
executions below. The first step looks for the best matching unit (BMU) of each record. The 
BMU is the most similar node to a record. The second step is to update the weight vectors of 
the nodes in the neighborhood of the BMU and the BMU itself by pulling them closer to the input 
vector. These steps are repeated until the updated differences become less than a threshold 𝜆. 
In this section, the SOM-based data sharing method is proposed to preserve privacy. One of 
the laboratory members previously proposed a method to collect electricity usage data that uses 
the SOM to share data while considering data privacy [66], which is a novel technique using the 
SOM for PPDM. The method proposed in this section is advanced version of this previous study 
while focusing on utilization for DR. For these reasons described in Section 5.3, the SOM is used 
to extract the features of electricity usage in the proposed method. 
In the previous method, the learning process of the SOM is executed repeatedly among power 
suppliers. The original method has a security problem. Power suppliers can tamper with the given 
SOM map. Moreover, the original method has a problem regarding calculation cost because it is 
difficult to parallelize the learning process. In addition, the proposed method improves the 
accuracy because it gives a higher weight to the peak power consumption to make the learning 
process effective for the DR services. In order to take the weight, peak time must be forecasted. 
The proposed method forecasts the time by using a model of time series analysis called seasonal 
autoregressive integrated moving average (SARIMA) model. 
5.4 Time series analyses 
Time series analyses analyze time series data while supposing that values in the data are related 
to their timestamps [67]. Time series data can be categorized into two types that are stationary 
time series data and non-stationary time series data. Time series data which statistical property 
are not changed are categorized to the stationary time series data. 
Stationary time series data can be represented by autoregressive model (AR) when each of the 
 
Figure 5-4 Self-organizing map 
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values are affected by noise in the past. Equation 5-1 shows the AR where 𝑦𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 are the 
value and the white noise at 𝑡, respectively. The 𝑎 is called autoregressive coefficient. 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 
  5-1 
Equation 5-1 can change the form as shown by equation 5-2. Since this form represents that 
time-series data depend on noises related to the past values, it is called moving average model 
(MA). The 𝑞-th order MA model can be represented by equation 5-3. The 𝑏 is called moving 
average coefficient. 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1
= 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑎1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑎1
2𝑦𝑡−2
= 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑎1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑎1
2𝜀𝑡−2 + 𝑎1
3𝑦𝑡−3
= 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑎1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑎1
2𝜀𝑡−2 + 𝑎1
3𝜀𝑡−3 + ⋯
 
  5-2 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 − 𝑏1𝜀𝑡−1 − 𝑏2𝜀𝑡−2 − ⋯ − 𝑏𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞
= 𝜀𝑡 − ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝜀𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
 
  5-3 
To represent property of time series data from autoregression and moving average aspects, 
another model with combination of AR and MA has been proposed. This model is called ARMA. 
ARMA that consists of 𝑝-th order AR and 𝑞-th order MA can be represented by equation 5-4. 
 𝑦𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑡 
  5-4 
Although ARMA is the model for stationary time series data, ARMA can be applied to non-
stationary time series data when focusing on differences between neighbor values. Equation 5-5, 
5-6, and 5-7 represent the first, second, and 𝑑-th order of the difference using lag operator 𝐿 
of 𝑦𝑛−1 = 𝐿𝑦𝑛, respectively. The ARMA considering the differences represented by equation 5-8 
is called autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA). 
 ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦𝑛−1 = 𝑦𝑛 − 𝐿𝑦𝑛 = (1 − 𝐿)𝑦𝑛 
  5-5 
 
∆2𝑦𝑡 = ∆𝑦𝑡 − ∆𝑦𝑡−1 = (1 − 𝐿)𝑦𝑛 − (1 − 𝐿)𝑦𝑛−1
= (1 − 𝐿)𝑦𝑛 − (1 − 𝐿)𝐿𝑦𝑛
= (1 − 𝐿)2𝑦𝑛
 
  5-6 
 ∆𝑑𝑦𝑡 = (1 − 𝐿)
𝑑𝑦𝑛 
  5-7 
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 ∆𝑑𝑦𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖∆
𝑑𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑏𝑗∆
𝑑𝜀𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 + ∆
𝑑𝜀𝑡 
  5-8 
ARIMA can be applied to another type of non-stationary time series data when the time series 
data has cyclic variation. For instance, when the cycle of the variation i.e. season is one year, 
the average of the differences between the values related to the same timestamp of the different 
years is nearly zero while the differences are stationary time series data. Such model is called 
SARIMA model. The seasonal difference 𝑦?̃? = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−𝑠 can be represented by equation 5-9 
where 𝑃 is the integral multiple of the season 𝑠. 𝑢𝑡 in equation 5-9 is the error term. Φ and Θ 
are the parameters. 
 𝑦?̃? = ∑ Φ𝑖?̃?(𝑡−𝑠∙𝑖)
𝑃
𝑖=1 − ∑ Θ𝑗𝑢(𝑡−𝑠∙𝑗)
𝑄
𝑗=1 + 𝑢𝑡 
  5-9 
The relationship between 𝑢𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 can be represented by equation 5-10 using parameters 𝜑 
and 𝜃. These two equations represent the SARIMA model. 
 𝑢𝑡 − 𝜑1𝑢𝑡−1 − ⋯ − 𝜑𝑝𝑢𝑡−𝑝 = 𝜀𝑡 − 𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1 − ⋯ − 𝜃𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞 
  5-10 
5.5 Proposed method to share electricity usage data 
5.5.1 Procedure to acquire shareable data 
The proposed method preserves privacy while converting records of electricity usage to a map 
of two-dimensional nodes created by the weighted SOM (WSOM) that is proposed in this study. 
After the WSOM repeatedly learns to obtain a node map of the electricity usages, it compares 
the input data with the temporal result of the learning to obtain the next temporal result. The 
input data are sets of records of electricity usage captured by a power supplier. It is enough to 
exchange the WSOM to obtain the characteristics of electricity usage without exchanging raw 
datasets of usage records obtained by power suppliers. 
The proposed method consists of three steps: mapping step, gathering step and counting step. 
Each power supplier first obtains a node map by using the WSOM in the mapping step. The 
obtained node maps are put together in a node map of all the power suppliers in the gathering 
step. Since the mapping process and the gathering process are divided into two steps, the mapping 
process can be done by each of the power suppliers. In other words, the portion of the procedure 
can be parallelized to distribute the load of the calculation. The node map does not have 
information on the number of households belonging to each node in the node map. This 
information is added during the counting step. The node map is shown as a cluster of groups, and 
each group consists of multiple electricity usage data of the households. An attacker cannot 
identify electricity usage of her/his target household because it is already statistical data. Figure 
5-5 illustrates the flow of the proposed method. 
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5.5.1.1 Mapping step 
The mapping step can be divided into three sub-steps. The first sub-step is executed only 
once, and the other sub-steps are executed iteratively. The first sub-step is the initialization of 
the map. This sub-step randomly resolves the initial positions and initial weight vectors of the 
nodes in the map. The second sub-step is to find the most similar BMU. The BMU for each 
record is calculated using equations 5-11 and 5-12, where 𝑤𝑖(𝑗) represents an 𝑖-th node and 
learns 𝑗 times using the WSOM, 𝑡 represents the sequential timestamp of the relevant record 𝑥 
where 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇, and 𝑎(𝑡) is a normal distribution function that enhances the accuracy of 
learning around timestamp 𝑝. Figure 5-6 shows the example of 𝑎(𝑡) when 𝑝 and 𝑇 are 30 and 48, 
respectively. The accuracy around 𝑝 compared with records of other timestamps increases when 
 
Figure 5-5 Flow of the proposed method to share electricity usage data 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Example of the normal distribution function 𝑎(𝑡) (𝑝 = 30, 𝑇 = 48) 
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a small value is set to the deviation 𝜎, and vice versa. When considering the DR, 𝑝 should be at 
the peak of electricity usage. Therefore, the WSOM allows analysts of electricity usage to adjust 
the importance of the accuracy around 𝑝 by 𝜎 according to their purposes. To set a small value 
to 𝜎 is proper for analyses that prioritize electricity usage around 𝑝, whereas a large value for 𝜎 
is proper for analyses that prioritize all electricity usage times. Trials in using the WSOM 
beforehand are necessary to set the appropriate value of 𝜎. The third sub-step is to update the 
nodes around the BMU. Equation 5-13 represents how the nodes are to be updated, where 𝐽 
denotes the maximum number of 𝑗’s, and 𝑑𝐵𝑀𝑈,𝑖 denotes the Euclidean distance between the 
BMU and the 𝑖-th node. 
 𝐵𝑀𝑈 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 (√∑ 𝑎(𝑡)(𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑤𝑖(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=1 )  
  5-11 
 𝑎~𝑁(𝑝, 𝜎2) ∶ 𝑎(𝑡) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎
𝑒−
(𝑡−𝑝)2
2𝜎2   
  5-12 
 𝑤𝑖(𝑗 + 1) = 𝑤𝑖(𝑗) + (1 −
𝑗
𝐽
) 𝑒
−
𝑑𝐵𝑀𝑈,𝑖
2
2𝜎(𝑗)2   
  5-13 
5.5.1.2 Gathering step 
In the gathering step, a node map of all the power suppliers is assembled from the node maps 
obtained in the mapping step. The mapping step method is again used for the assembling. This 
node map is shared among power suppliers. 
5.5.1.3 Counting step 
In the counting step, power suppliers check how many households are related to each node in 
the node map generated in the gathering step. The easiest way of sharing the counting information 
is by using a database. However, this is not the best way when considering the privacy risks of 
sharing counting information because each power supplier could identify the information given by 
other power suppliers. Three options for the counting are assumed as follows. 
Using homomorphic encryption is the first option. In this option, the counting result is kept 
secret. Although the calculation cost of homomorphic encryption tends to be high, in this case, 
the counting step only requires adding values, which makes the calculation cost of homomorphic 
encryption much lower than usual. Therefore, homomorphic encryption is suitable compared to 
other methods that are appropriate for calculation cost saving, such as Paillier encryption [68] 
and the additive El Gamal encryption [69]. 
The second option is by making the power suppliers add the information in the rotation. The 
first power supplier adds an initial value to a counter for a node in the node map respectively 
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while the power supplier only knows the initial values. For the next step, all power suppliers add 
the number of households to relevant counters in the rotation. Finally, the first power supplier 
subtracts the initial values from the respective counters to finalize the result. Although this 
option also preserves the data privacy of households, it is not safer than the first option when 
power suppliers cooperate to reveal the information added from a power supplier. The final power 
supplier is also able to know the initial values. For instance, the values added by the first power 
supplier could be revealed if other power suppliers subtract the values added by them from the 
relevant counter. 
The third option is to ask a trustworthy third-party agency, such as the aggregator, to manage 
the counting instead of a database. A power supplier first obtains the node map assembled in the 
gathering step and counts the number of households for their relevant node. The counting result 
is sent to the agency, who publishes the counting result—which is the sum of all the information 
obtained from all power suppliers—but does not publish each information. 
5.5.2 Forecast of peak electricity usage 
To define 𝑝 in equation 5-12, the proposed method requires forecasts of the peak time of 
electricity usage. The proposed method uses a SARIMA model for the forecasting because this 
model can be constructed even from values captured from seasonal time-series data such as 
electricity usage data captured from smart meters [67]. In the proposed method, the electricity 
usage in one day is forecasted by the SARIMA model while the electricity usage until seven days 
before the day is used as the input values. In this study, the parameters of the SARIMA model 
were defined by using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC) [70].  
5.6 Evaluation 
Two datasets of the smart meter are used to evaluate the proposed method. One of the 
datasets was captured in a smart city located in Kawasaki city, Japan (𝐷𝐾). The other dataset, 
named the Irish smart meter dataset, was provided by the commission for regulation (𝐷𝐼) [71]. 
The numbers of households in each dataset are 53 and 1,000, respectively. The timestamp period 
of the data is 30 min in both datasets. The evaluation environment including the proposed method 
was implemented using Python 2.7. 
5.6.1 Information loss 
In this evaluation, 𝑘-member clustering is assumed to be used to anonymize the electricity 
usage data to publish the data while preserving data privacy. As mentioned in Section 2.4, 
anonymization causes information loss, which depends on data property. A comparison of two 
different anonymization methods is carried out to evaluate the information loss when using the 
same datasets in order to prevent the influences of data property [72] [73]. The two situations 
of 𝑘-member clustering were compared to evaluate the information loss in the proposed method. 
5  Anonymization method to share electricity usage data 
53 
 
 
For both situations, the electricity usage data of all power suppliers are anonymized by 𝑘-member 
clustering. The difference in the situations is the input data of the clustering. In one situation, 
the input of the 𝑘-member clustering is the electricity usage data including all power suppliers 
generated by the proposed method. In the other situation, the data of each power supplier are 
anonymized, respectively. The information loss of the situations (𝐼𝐿𝑃 and 𝐼𝐿𝐼, respectively) is 
calculated using the equation 5-14, where 𝑁 denotes the number of records, and 𝑐𝑗  and 𝑥𝑗 
represent the value after and before anonymization, respectively. Equation 5-15 represents the 
rate of the information loss in the two situations. 
 𝐼𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∑ |𝑐𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗|
𝑁
𝑗=1  
  5-14 
  
Table 5-1 Rate of information loss (𝑅𝐼𝐿) in 𝐷𝐾 
 when 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑘 are set from 2 to 4 and 2 to 10, respectively (MapSize is 5 × 5) 
𝑛𝑝 
𝑘         
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 1.55 1.23 1.15 1.09 1.05 1.06 0.99 1.04 1.04 
3 1.45 1.13 1.08 1.03 1.03 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.01 
4 1.38 1.15 0.98 1.02 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.94 0.96 
 
Table 5-2 Rate of information loss (𝑅𝐼𝐿) in 𝐷𝐾 
 when 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑘 are set from 2 to 4 and 2 to 10, respectively (MapSize is 10 × 10) 
𝑛𝑝 
𝑘         
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 1.20 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.96 1.04 1.04 
3 1.13 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.05 
4 1.06 0.98 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.88 0.92 0.96 
 
Table 5-3 Rate of information loss (𝑅𝐼𝐿) in 𝐷𝐼 
 when 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑘 are set from 5 to 15 and 2 to 20, respectively (MapSize is 10 × 10) 
𝑛𝑝 
𝑘          
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
5 1.62 1.14 1.03 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.89 
10 1.51 1.07 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.83 
15 1.48 1.04 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.86 0.81 0.82 
 
Table 5-4 Rate of information loss (𝑅𝐼𝐿) in 𝐷𝐼 
 when 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑘 are set from 5 to 15 and 2 to 20, respectively (MapSize is 20 × 20) 
𝑛𝑝 
𝑘          
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
5 1.45 1.03 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.86 
10 1.32 0.95 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.81 
15 1.28 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.78 0.80 
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 𝑅𝐼𝐿 =
𝐼𝐿𝑃
𝐼𝐿𝐼
 
  5-15 
Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 represent 𝑅𝐼𝐿 in 𝐷𝐾 while 𝑘 is defined from 2 to 10, and the number 
of power suppliers 𝑛𝑝 is defined from 2 to 4. The map sizes of the WSOM are 5 × 5 and 10 × 10, 
respectively. Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 represent 𝑅𝐼𝐿 in 𝐷𝐼 while 𝑘 is defined from 2 to 20, and 
the number of power suppliers 𝑛𝑝 is defined from 5 to 15. The map sizes of the WSOM are 
10 × 10 and 20 × 20. Although 𝑘 would not set to small number such as 2 in real situation due 
to the paucity of anonymity, 𝑘 was defined from 2 just for the evaluation. 
According to the four tables, 𝐼𝐿𝑃 is smaller than 𝐼𝐿𝐼 when the values of 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑘 are large in 
both datasets. Compared with the conditions, 𝐼𝐿𝑃 is larger than 𝐼𝐿𝐼 when 𝑘 is defined to a small 
value, such as 2. The evaluation result shows that the information loss of the proposed method 
is reduced when 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑘 are large. In particular, the information loss is reduced up to 22% in 
Table 5-4 when 𝑘 and 𝑛𝑝 are set to 18 and 15, respectively. 
5.6.2 Accuracy of value while considering DR 
As mentioned in equation 5-12, the accuracy of the proposed method depends on  𝑎(𝑡), and 
its strength can be adjusted by 𝜎. Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8 represent the amount of mean 
absolute error (MAE) at all times (𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙) and at the peak time (𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘) while shifting 𝜎
2 
from 0.1 to 100.0. 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙 and 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 are calculated by equations 5-16 and 5-17, respectively. 
The amounts of error in Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8 are measured while 𝐷𝐾 and 𝐷𝐼 are used, 
respectively. In addition, the amounts of error when no weight was given (𝑎(𝑡) = 1) are also 
measured, and represented in these two figures. 
 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ ∑ |𝑤𝑛(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑛(𝑡)|
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑛=1  
  5-16 
 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 =
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ |𝑤𝑛(𝑝) − 𝑥𝑛(𝑝)|
𝑁
𝑛=1  
  5-17 
According to Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8, the accuracy during peak times is high when 𝜎2 is 
small whereas the accuracy at all times is lower than during peak times. There is a trade-off 
between the accuracy during peak times and at all times. This trade-off is shown from the result 
when 𝜎2 is set to 1.0 in 𝐷𝐾. According to Figure 5-7, the result has a 40% lower 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 but 
a 56% higher 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙 than the no-weight result. In addition, the balance in the trade-off depends 
on the relevant dataset. The dependency is also shown from the results in Figure 5-7 and Figure 
5-8, where 𝜎2 is set to 1.0. In contrast to 𝐷𝐾, the result of 𝐷𝐼 has a 60% lower 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 but a 
40% higher 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙  than the no-weight result. Therefore, 𝜎
2  must be defined based on the 
required accuracy for each dataset. When the supposing DR service for 𝐷𝐾 allows an 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙 of 
up to 0.08 kWh, choosing 1.0 as 𝜎2 will minimize the 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘. 
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5.7 Summary 
In this section, an anonymization method to share electricity usage while preserving data 
 
Figure 5-7 Amount of mean absolute error (𝑀𝐴𝐸) in all and peak time in 𝐷𝐾 
 while shifting parameter of variance (𝜎2) is from 0.1 to 100.0 
 
 
Figure 5-8 Amount of mean absolute error (𝑀𝐴𝐸) in all and peak time in 𝐷𝐼 
 while shifting parameter of variance (𝜎2) is from 0.1 to 100.0 
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privacy is proposed. The proposed method uses the self-organizing map and allows power 
suppliers to share a node map of the electricity usage while allowing the raw data to be captured 
from the smart meters. The proposed method enables DTI4SFS to anonymize time-series data. 
Our evaluation results show that the proposed method achieves the same level of 𝑘-anonymity 
with small information loss compared with other conventional method that anonymize data of each 
power supplier without data sharing. In particular, information loss is reduced by 22% when 𝑘 and 
𝑛𝑝 are set to 18 and 15, respectively. 
The evaluation result also shows that the electricity usage data shared by the proposed method 
can be used for the DR. The accuracy of the shared data can be adjusted, and a trade-off exists 
between the accuracy at all times and during peak times. 
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6 Watermarking method for anonymized data 
In this study, DTI4SFS that is an anonymization infrastructure for PPDP using anonymization 
is proposed. The infrastructure allows data users to acquire anonymized data by having them 
request requirements such as data entries and privacy protection levels. Request constraints are 
defined by the data provider and are published with the data property by the infrastructure in 
advance. The infrastructure has a special anonymization procedure named one-directional 
anonymization that refers to previously published data. Such procedure prevents attacks that 
spoil the privacy protection by aggregating previously published data. 
However, the proposed infrastructure still has a problem when it comes to the illegal 
republishing of data. The infrastructure provides the same data to some data users when the 
users request the same requirements to the infrastructure, and some of the users may republish 
the anonymized data without the permission of the data providers. In this case, the illegal data 
user should be identified when the illegally published data is accessed. This identification function 
will act as a deterrent to illegal republication. Anonymized data should provide the information 
pertaining to the official user of the data to identify illegal data republication. Therefore, published 
data should be unique regarding its data users. Watermarking is well suited for this purpose. 
Watermarking adds a watermark into the data by modifying the values of the data to identify the 
users who published the data. Figure 6-1 shows the supposed usage of watermarking in this study. 
In the proposed infrastructure, information related to each data user is watermarked to the 
anonymized data before the data publishing. When the illegally published data is found, the 
watermarked information will be extracted to identify the illegal data user. In the watermarking 
research domain, multimedia data such as audio data, picture data, video data, and text data are 
popular targets for watermarking [74] [75]. Despite the availability of watermarking, the 
conventional watermarking methods are not appropriate for use with anonymized data because 
they change the anonymity level and degrades the usefulness of the data. 
 
Figure 6-1 Supposed usage of watermarking in the proposed infrastructure 
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Moreover, the type of anonymized data, which DTI4SFS deals with, is different from multimedia 
data. Multimedia data allows us to watermark information sequentially, because the data 
comprises ordered information, such as the elapsed time of the audio or video data. dditionally, 
multimedia data does not negatively influence the quality of the data when modified, given that 
multimedia data has data redundancy. Data such as audio data has high-frequency components 
that humans cannot hear. In contrast to multimedia data, records in anonymized data do not have 
a sequence, and their values do not have suitable positions for modification by watermarking. 
Another issue is the revealing of watermarks, which is a common problem faced by all 
watermarking techniques. Revealing may occur when several anonymized datasets are generated 
and published from the same original data. Watermarking for anonymized data has to be tolerant 
of a modification that reveals the watermarks while simultaneously preventing the degradation of 
the anonymity level. 
6.1 Related techniques of the proposed watermarking method 
The proposed watermarking method utilizes several error correction techniques in conjunction 
with cryptography. This section describes the combined techniques. 
6.1.1 Advanced encryption standard 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric-key encryption method and is a type 
of block cipher. Symmetric key encryption uses one secret key for both the encryption and 
decryption processes. The block cipher encrypts plaintext at intervals of several bits. Each 
interval is called a block; the general block length of AES is 128 bits. The length of ciphertext is 
multiple numbers of the block length. 
AES outputs ciphertext that is generated from multiple blocks when the length of the plaintext 
is longer than the block length. The encryption process should not isolate the blocks to prevent 
attacks that replace parts of the ciphertext to modify its plaintext. Moreover, the key for 
encryption should be changed with every block encrypted; otherwise, attackers would be able to 
read the plaintext from a ciphertext without decryption. In other words, a block of ciphertext will 
show the same block of plaintext when the same key is used for the encryption. Several ways to 
connect blocks have been proposed to solve these problems such as Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) mode, Cipher-FeedBack (CFB) mode, Output-FeedBack (OFB) mode, and CounTeR 
(CTR) mode [76]. 
6.1.1.1 CBC mode 
In CBC mode, neighbor blocks are connected by exclusive-OR operations. Figure 6-2 and 
Figure 6-3 illustrates the encryption and decryption flows, respectively. The encryption flow of 
the CBC mode takes an exclusive OR of a block of the plaintext and a block of the ciphertext 
encrypted from the previous block of the plaintext before every encryption process. The exclusive 
OR processes prevent the problem that could be happened when the same blocks of plaintext 
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appear. CBC mode requires an initial vector (IV) taken to the exclusive OR of the first block of 
the plaintext. Ciphertext of AES with CBC mode is unique if the same combination of the key for 
the encryption and the IV is set to the same plaintext. IV is generally updated at every encryption 
by using a pseudorandom generator whereas the key for the encryption is not changed. 
When a part of ciphertext is flipped from 0 to 1 and vice versa (bit flipping), the flipping affects 
two blocks which are the block containing the flipped bit and the neighbor block. When a bit 
string of a block in the ciphertext is changed, the change affects the changed block and blocks 
encrypted after the changed block. The affected blocks would fail to be decrypted. 
6.1.1.2 CFB mode 
Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 illustrate encryption and decryption flow of AES with CFB mode, 
 
Figure 6-2 Encryption flow of CBC mode (refer to [76]) 
 
 
Figure 6-3 Decryption flow of CBC mode (refer to [76]) 
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respectively. Compared with CBC mode, IV or a block of the previously output ciphertext is 
encrypted whereas the other parts of the encryption flow are same as CBC mode. On the other 
hand, the decryption flow of CFB mode uses the encryption process of AES instead of the 
decryption process. 
Influence of the bit flipping and the change of block length are same as CBC mode. Bit flipping 
of a ciphertext encrypted by AES with CFB mode affects the block containing the flipped bit and 
its neighbor block. Change of bit string of a block in the ciphertext affects the changed block and 
blocks encrypted after the changed block. 
6.1.1.3 OFB mode 
Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 illustrate the encryption and decryption flows of AES with OFB 
 
Figure 6-4 Encryption flow of CFB mode (refer to [76]) 
 
 
Figure 6-5 Decryption flow of CFB mode (refer to [76]) 
 
Initial
Vector
Encryption Encryption Encryption Encryption
Plaintext
Input block 1 Input block 2 Input block 3 Input block 4
＋ ＋ ＋ ＋XOR XOR XOR XOR
Output block 1 Output block 2 Output block 3 Output block 4
Ciphertext
Initial
Vector
Encryption Encryption Encryption Encryption
Plaintext
Output block 1 Output block 2 Output block 3 Output block 4
＋ ＋ ＋ ＋XOR XOR XOR XOR
Input block 1 Input block 2 Input block 3 Input block 4
Ciphertext
6  Watermarking method for anonymized data 
61 
 
 
mode. In the encryption flow, IV is encrypted by AES iteratively before every exclusive-OR 
operation whereas the plaintext itself is not directly encrypted. The decryption flow consists of 
encryption processes of AES as same as CFB mode. Implementation cost of OFB mode is lower 
than the other mode because the decryption flow of OFB mode is same as the encryption flow. 
Moreover, the flows can be parallelized because the encryption process and the exclusive-OR 
operation are independent of each other. The parallelization is achieved when the all encryption 
processes of IV are done beforehand. 
Influence of the bit flipping and the change of block length are less than CBC and CFB modes 
because each block in OFB mode is isolated whereas the encrypted IVs are not isolated. Namely, 
 
Figure 6-6 Encryption flow of OFB mode (refer to [76]) 
 
 
Figure 6-7 Decryption flow of OFB mode (refer to [76]) 
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the bit flipping and the change of block length affect the flipped or changed block only. However, 
the position of the flipped bit on the ciphertext is same as its plaintext. Therefore, attackers can 
modify the plaintext without the decryption process. 
6.1.1.4 CTR mode 
AES with CTR mode requires a bit string named nonce instead of an IV. The role of nonces is 
similar to IVs. Figure 6-8 and Figure 6-9 illustrate the encryption and decryption flows of CTR 
mode, respectively. The nonce is counted up to prepare unique values to each block of the 
plaintext. Each of the prepared values is encrypted, and the block of the ciphertext is generated 
by an exclusive-OR operation of the encrypted value and the block of the plaintext. In contrast 
 
Figure 6-8 Encryption flow of CTR mode (refer to [76]) 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Decryption flow of CTR mode (refer to [76]) 
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to OFB mode, the encryption processes of AES can be parallelized as well as the exclusive-OR 
operations. Influence of the bit flipping and the change of block length are same as OFB mode.  
CBC mode and CTR mode are recommended by Ferguson et al. [77]. As shown in Section 
6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.4, one of the differences between CBC mode and CTR mode is the influence 
on neighboring blocks when the bit flipping happens. In CBC mode, when a bit in a block gets 
flipped, it affects the block and its two neighboring blocks which prevents them to provide the 
correct decryption result. In contrast, bit flipping in CTR mode only affects a single block. 
Cryptography techniques should not give attackers information that facilitates their attacks, 
such as information that comes from the imbalance of the bits in the ciphertexts. Therefore, bits 
in ciphertexts should be well balanced. According to Matsuoka et al., the number of bits that 
express ‘1' is 50% in the ciphertext of AES [78]. The study shows that bits in the ciphertext of 
AES are well balanced. 
6.1.2 Turbo code 
The error-correction code enables one to recover the correct bit string, even when the bit 
string contains flipped bits, by adding a string of parity bits into the original bit string. Turbo 
code is one of the error-correction codes whose transmission efficiency is regarded to be among 
the most efficient in the data transmission domain [79]. In other words, turbo code requires 
shorter bit lengths to encode a bit string to achieve the same error-correction ability as other 
error-correction code methods. Figure 6-10 illustrates the flow of the encoding process. In the 
encoding process, the turbo code first interleaves the input data string, generating two parity bit 
strings from the original data string and the interleaved string using an internal encoder. Next, 
the generated strings are decimated alternately to reduce the total length of the two strings by 
half (the puncturing process). Although the puncturing process is irreversible, it is effective in 
reducing the length of a bit string that results from the encoding. Finally, the punctured parity 
bit string is connected to the original bit string. Figure 6-11 shows the puncturing process. 
Figure 6-12 illustrates the overview of the decoding process. In the decoding process, the 
turbo code attempts to obtain the decoded result by repeatedly running an internal decoder. The 
 
Figure 6-10 Flow of the encoding process of turbo code (refer to [79]) 
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Soft Output Viterbi Algorithm (SOVA) [80] is one such process algorithm. In this algorithm, a 
data string and a parity bit string are used for each running process. Additionally, a decoded 
result output from the previous running process is also input into the next running process. Prior 
to the decoding process, an encoded bit string is divided into a data string and a parity bit string. 
The two parity bit strings that were punctured during the encoding process are recovered from 
the parity bit string of the encoded bit string by using the intermediate values instead of the bits 
omitted during the puncturing process as shown in Figure 6-13. For each running process of the 
internal decoder, non-interleaved and interleaved data strings are used alternatively. The 
previous decoded result is also interleaved or de-interleaved before the next running process 
using the data string. The recovered parity bit string is selected according to the condition 
whether the data string is interleaved or not. The final decoding result will be completed by the 
iteration of the internal decoding. 
6.1.3 Gray code converter 
Gray code converts data values to make all Hamming distances of neighboring values equal to 
1. Generally, when the Hamming distance is small, a value that includes a flipped bit expressing 
a similar value to the original value. Therefore, using the gray code with error-correction code 
enhances the error-correction ability of the code. 
Figure 6-14 shows examples of the conversion. The gray code converter outputs an exclusive 
OR of an input bit string, and a bit string which was a one-bit shifted input bit string to the lower 
bit. For instance, when an input bit string is ‘101’, the gray code converter outputs ‘111’ that 
is an exclusive O㻾 of ‘101’ and ‘010’. As shown in Figure 6-14, Hamming distances of 
neighboring output values are 1. 
6.2 Proposed watermarking method 
6.2.1 Features of the proposed watermarking method 
In this study, the proposed watermarking method is used to identify the person who republished 
 
 
Figure 6-11 Puncturing process 
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the anonymized data received from DTI4SFS without authorization. The watermarking method 
should allow only authorized people to access the watermarked information (access control). Also, 
watermarked information should be able to be extracted even if the anonymized data containing 
that watermarked information is modified (robustness). Moreover, the proposed watermarking 
method should include protection from attacks where multiple malicious data users attempt to 
extract watermarked information by comparing the anonymized data received by each of the data 
users (a collision attack).  
In the proposed watermarking method, watermarked information is encrypted before being 
watermarked, and it uses AES for access control. Access control can be achieved because only 
the people who are authorized to access the watermarked information know the secret key of the 
encryption. 
Use of AES is also effective to protect against collusion attacks. Attackers in collusion attacks 
attempt to extract watermarked information by comparing multiple instances of the published 
anonymized data. Even when the proposed watermarking method expresses the watermarked 
 
Figure 6-12 Flow of the decoding process of turbo code (refer to [79]) 
 
 
Figure 6-13 Process of recovering from punctured string 
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information in the form of binary data, when the values of the anonymized data are modified, 
attackers cannot identify whether the differences express ‘0' or ‘1' from a statistical point of 
view if the probability of occurrence of ‘0' and ‘1' in the binary data is the same. As mentioned 
in Section 6.1.1, the probability is the same in AES ciphertexts. Therefore, the proposed 
watermarking method can protect watermarked information from collusion attacks. 
The proposed watermarking method should also consider another type of attack whereby 
attackers try to delete or degrade the watermarked information by changing the values of 
published data (a distortion attack). Distortion attacks can be treated as noise added to the data. 
In this study, turbo code is used to protect watermarks from distortion attacks, since the length 
of the parity bit string that the code requires is shorter than other error-correction code 
techniques. Given that the degree of modification for watermarking is proportional to the length 
of the watermarked bit string, using turbo code is one of the best approaches to minimize 
degradation of the value of the anonymized data resulting from watermarking. The proposed 
watermarking method encodes information that will be watermarked into anonymized data after 
AES encryption. Additionally, the encoded information is converted using a gray code converter 
to enhance the error correction ability of turbo code. 
6.2.2 Entire flow of the proposed watermarking method 
Figure 6-15 illustrates the entire flow of the proposed watermarking method. The upper side 
and the bottom side of the figure show the watermarking and extracting flows, respectively. In 
the watermarking flow, a plaintext is first encrypted to ciphertext by AES with the block length 
of the encryption being 128 bits. Next, the ciphertext is encoded by the turbo code. The encoding 
adds a parity bit string whose length is same as the ciphertext. Finally, the encoded bit string is 
watermarked to the anonymized data by modifying the values of that data. The encoded bit string 
is converted into gray code just before the modification. 
In the extracting flow, the proposed watermarking method first extracts a bit string from the 
anonymized data that has been republished without authorization. The extraction involves the 
inverse conversion of the gray code. Next, the extracted bit string is decoded by the turbo code, 
and finally, the decoded string is decrypted by AES. In the proposed watermarking method, CTR 
mode is selected for use by AES since the influence of distortion attacks is small. 
A systematic convolutional code was implemented as the internal encoder of the turbo code. 
The code holds a current state and decides the next state according to an input bit and the 
 
Figure 6-14 Converting examples of gray code 
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current state. A parity bit is an output when the state changes. Figure 6-16 shows a trellis 
diagram of the implemented code. The initial state is S1. When a bit string ‘011’ is input, ‘010’ 
is output as a parity bit string while its state changes from S1 to S2 via S3. The implemented 
turbo code used SOVA for the decoding process. 
Figure 6-17 illustrates the interleaving process that was implemented for the turbo code. The 
interleaver divides an input bit string into parts at 3-bit intervals. The parts of the bit string are 
arranged in row directions. An interleaved bit string is created by joining the arranged parts along 
the column direction. The reverse process of the interleaving was also implemented as the de-
interleaver. 
6.2.3 Watermarking process of the proposed method 
In the proposed watermarking method, the process that watermarks the information into 
anonymized data consists of two sub-processes: a grouping process and a modification process 
of anonymized values. The grouping process first sorts records of anonymized data and then 
makes record groups so that each group includes all records that have the same values of the 
sorted items. The grouping process was implemented to watermark information sequentially. 
Otherwise the sequential order for the watermarking would be broken by changing the order of 
the records since anonymized data includes records that have the same values for privacy 
protection. 
In the modification process, values are modified to express the watermarked information. The 
number of modified records in each record group expresses the watermarked information. Each 
record group expresses a part of the information when the information is larger than the number 
of records in the record group because the bit length of the part is as large as the largest the 
record group can express. 
 
Figure 6-15 Entire flow of the proposed watermarking method 
 
Watermarking Flow
Extracting Flow
Encoding
(Turbo code)
Encryption
(AES)
0111…0010
128bits×num. of blocks
“Info”
Information
to be watermarked
Gray Code 
Conversion
0111…0010 0011…1101
Parity bit string
Double in size
0001…0101 1000…1011
Watermarking
Anonymized Data 
with Watermarking
Anonymized Data
A A W
“Info”
Decoding
(Turbo code)
Decryption
(AES)
0111…00100111…0010 0011…1101
Extract  and inversely convert bit string
Anonymized Data with 
Watermarking
A W
6  Watermarking method for anonymized data 
68 
 
 
Table 6-1 illustrates an example of an anonymized data table after the grouping process. The 
example table shows the degree of congestion of rooms classified as north, south, east, and west. 
In the table, records are sorted by “Time slot” item and then divided into two groups, G1 and 
G2. Table 6-2 is an example of an anonymized data table after the modification process when the 
watermarked information is ‘1011' in binary format. In this example, “Area of room” is set to a 
target item of the modification and the modified values are underlined. In Table 6-2, G1 expresses 
the first bit from the left side of the watermarked information since the number of records in G1 
is one. The value of the left most bit is ‘1'. One record in G1 has been modified because the 
value ‘1' converted by the gray code is ‘1'. G2 can be expressed as any value from 0 to 7 by 
the watermarking method since it has 7 records. Therefore, G2 supports 3-bit bit strings. A part 
of the information that has not yet been watermarked is ‘011' where the converted value of ‘011' 
is ‘010'. Since the decimal format of ‘010' is ‘2', two of the records in G2 have been modified. 
The modification process degrades the value of the data due to the abstraction of the 
watermarking process. The modification process does not modify records repeatedly to minimize 
the degradation. 
 
Figure 6-16 Trellis diagram of systematic convolutional code 
 
 
Figure 6-17 Interleaving process of implemented interleaver 
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In this study, four abstraction methods were implemented for the proposed watermarking 
method to modify the values of the anonymized data while preventing any additional leaks of 
private information. 㼀he first method is named “masking method” which replaces a part of a value 
to a wildcard character ‘*.' 㼀he second method is named “extension method” which adds 
candidates of a part of a value. For instance, “Hoge city” can be modified to “Hoge or Foo city” 
by the extension method. 㼀he third method is named “replacing method” which replaces a part 
of a value to a candidate of the value. This method is updated version of the replacing described 
in Section 2.1.4. It was updated to suppress the information loss to low levels. The last method 
is named “arranging method” which changes the order of a part of a value that has multiple 
candidates. Watermarked information can be extracted from watermarked anonymized data by 
comparing it with non-watermarked anonymized data, which is called the comparison process. In 
this process, the number of anonymized records used in the watermarking process are counted 
in each record group. The sequence of the number denotes the watermarked bit string that is 
encrypted by AES, coded by turbo code, and converted by gray code. The extraction flow 
described in Section 6.2.2 and Figure 6-15 show how the plaintext is extracted from the 
watermarked bit string. In contrast to general watermarking methods, the watermark of the 
proposed watermarking method is visible by comparison between watermarked and non-
watermarked anonymized data since the proposed watermarking method modifies values. However, 
the proposed method can be categorized into watermarking techniques because data users are 
not able to notice the watermark without comparisons. Even if a data user findｓ differences by 
comparison between multiple watermarked data, the data user cannot extract the watermark from 
the statistical aspect as described in Section 6.2.1. 
Table 6-1 Example data table after grouping process 
Group Time slot Area of room Congestion 
G1 8:00-8:30 East Empty 
G2 
8:30-9:00 South Full 
8:30-9:00 North Medium 
8:30-9:00 East Full 
8:30-9:00 West Empty 
8:30-9:00 North Medium 
8:30-9:00 South Medium 
8:30-9:00 East Full 
 
Table 6-2 Example data table after modification process 
Group Time slot Area of room Congestion 
G1 8:00-8:30 South or East Empty 
G2 
8:30-9:00 South Full 
8:30-9:00 North Medium 
8:30-9:00 East Full 
8:30-9:00 West Empty 
8:30-9:00 North Medium 
8:30-9:00 South or East Medium 
8:30-9:00 South or East Full 
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The non-watermarked anonymized data is not published to the data users, making it impossible 
for the attackers to compare watermarked and non-watermarked anonymized data for watermark 
extraction. Therefore, the only way for the attackers to extract watermarked information is to 
compare multiple sets of published anonymized data. This is called collusion attack as mentioned 
in Section 6.2.1. The proposed watermarking method protects the watermarked information from 
collusion attacks by using the characteristic of the AES encryption as described in Section 6.2.1. 
6.3 Specification of the implemented turbo code 
6.3.1 Success rate of error correction 
Before evaluating the proposed watermarking method, the error correction ability of the 
implemented turbo code was measured while shifting the length of a bit string input to the turbo 
code from 128 bits to 384 bits at 128-bit intervals. The input bit strings were the ciphertext of 
AES using the CTR mode, which was created by randomly generated plaintexts, secret keys, and 
nonces. Figure 6-18 illustrates the success rate of error corrections when some bits of input bit 
strings are flipped before the decoding process of the turbo code. The flipping rate against the 
input bit string was set from 1/256 to 1 while the decoding process was executed twenty times 
for each flipping rate. The internal decoder ran up to one thousand times for each of the decoding 
process. The iteration of the internal decoding process was a bottleneck in terms of the decoding 
processing time. To reduce the influence of the bottleneck, the iteration was aborted when the 
internal decoder output the same result for four times in a row. 
 
Figure 6-18 Success rate of error correction (1) 
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Figure 6-18 shows that the success rate is greater than 80% when the flipping rate was 1/16 
or smaller, and 0% when the flipping rate was 1/8 or larger. Figure 6-19 shows another result of 
the measurement with the same conditions as Figure 6-18 except for the flipping rate of the input 
bit string. The flipping rate was set from 1/16 to 1/8 to clarify the fluctuation of the success rate 
using these flipping rates. In Figure 6-19, the success rate fluctuated linearly. Also, for most of 
the flipping rates, the success rate was small compared to others where the input bit strings were 
longer than in this case. This is because SOVA calculates the most feasible path of state transition 
 
Figure 6-19 Success rate of error correction (2) 
 
 
Figure 6-20 Distribution of number of decoding (128 bits) 
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of the internal encoder at every 1 bit of the input bit string when decimating the paths to reduce 
the calculation cost of the decoding process. Therefore, the total number of the decimated paths 
is comparatively small when the length of the input bit string is short. 
6.3.2 Validity of the maximum limit of iteration 
The required number of iterations of the internal decoding was measured to output the correct 
decoding result when the length of the input bit string is 128, 256, and 384 bits to evaluate the 
validity of the maximum limit of iteration of the internal decoding process. The results are shown 
in Figure 6-20, Figure 6-21, and Figure 6-22, respectively. The number of flipped bits was set 
to 23, 42, and 64 bits, respectively, such that the success rate of the decoding process is 50% 
for each of the conditions. The numbers of flipped bits measured are displayed in Figure 6-19. 
 
Figure 6-21 Distribution of number of decoding (256 bits) 
 
 
Figure 6-22 Distribution of number of decoding (384 bits) 
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For each of the three figures, the horizontal axis indicates the number of iterations of the internal 
decoding executed until the result of the internal decoding became stable while the vertical axis 
indicates the number of the decoding processes. The decoding process was executed two 
thousand times for each of the three measurements. Executions that failed to decode were 
excluded since the evaluations focused on the influence of the maximum limit to the success rate. 
Executions that were unstable at the maximum limit of the iteration were also excluded as outliers. 
The averages of the number of the iterations required were 44.41, 33.88, and 61.31, respectively. 
The three measurement results show that most of the decoding processes became stable within 
four hundred iterations, and the required number of iterations to output the correct decoding 
result decreased exponentially when increasing the values of the vertical axis. 
To confirm whether the maximum limit of one thousand is large enough or not, the rate of the 
executions of the internal decoding process that were iterated until the maximum limit was 
measured. As same as the measurement in Section 6.3.1, the flipping rate against the input bit 
string was set from 1/256 to 1 while the decoding process was executed twenty times for each 
flipping rate. The rates were measured while the maximum limit was set to one thousand times, 
two thousand times, and three thousand times, respectively. The length of the input bit string 
was set to 128 bits. Table 6-3 shows the rate of executions that were unstable until the maximum 
limit while Figure 6-23 shows another measurement result that shows the success rate of the 
decoding process of the three patterns of the maximum limit. The rates in Table 6-3 get small 
when their maximum limit becomes large. However, according to Figure 6-23, there are no 
differences of the success rate among the three patterns. Therefore, the success rate of the 
internal decoding process is not improved even if the maximum limit is larger than one thousand 
times. This relationship between the success rate and the maximum limit were shown when the 
length of the input bit string was set to either 256 or 384 bits. For these results shown in Section 
6.3.2, the maximum limit of the number of iterations is reasonable when the limit is one thousand. 
6.3.3 Validity of aborting iterations of internal decoding 
Table 6-3 Rate of executions that were unstable until the maximum limit 
Maximum limit Flipping rate against the input bit string 1/256 1/128 1/64 1/32 1/16 1/8 1/4 1/2 1 
1,000 times 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 75% 80% 90% 95% 
2,000 times 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 70% 65% 80% 95% 
3,000 times 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 70% 45% 65% 95% 
 
Table 6-4 Rates of incorrect aborting 
Aborting condition 
Flipping rate of bits 
1/16 
+5/128 
1/16 
+6/128 
1/16 
+7/128 1/8 
Four times 5% 0% 15% 0% 
Six times 0% 0% 10% 0% 
Eight times 0% 0% 5% 0% 
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The implemented decoding process aborts the iteration of the internal decoding process when 
the internal decoder outputs the same result four times in a row. In this section, the rate where 
the decoded result of the aborted decoding process is different compared to the case when the 
internal decoding process is iterated one thousand times was measured. The rates were measured 
while shifting the flipping rate of bits of the input bit string from 1/16 to 1/8. Table 6-4 shows a 
part of the result of the measurement when the aborting condition is four, six, and eight times. 
The rates of all the aborting conditions were 0% when the flipping rate of bits was 1/16 + 4/128 
or lower. According to Table 6-4, the rate is small when the aborting condition is large. When 
the decoded result at abortion was different from the result after thousand iterations, both results 
were incorrect. Therefore, the aborting condition of the implemented decoding process does not 
degrade the decoding process. 
6.4 Evaluation 
In this study, the proposed watermarking method was implemented. Additionaly, three 
distortion attacks were executed using Python 3.5 to evaluate the proposed watermarking method 
tolerance to the distortion attacks. The distortion attacks are a deleting attack, an adding attack, 
and a replacing attack that respectively delete, add, or replace the records of the data. These 
are common types of distortion attacks in the watermarking domain. 
 
Figure 6-23 Success rate of the decoding process of the three patterns 
 of the maximum limit (1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 times) 
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6.4.1 Tolerance against distortion attacks 
The tolerance to the distortion attacks of the proposed watermarking method was evaluated 
by attempting to extract correct watermarked information from the anonymized data modified by 
the distortion attacks. Measurements for the evaluation were executed for each abstraction 
method. Anonymized data for the evaluations was generated from the location data of bus stops 
published at linkdata.org [81]. The location data of a bus stop itself does not contain private 
information. However, the data has to be anonymized if the data also indicates where passengers 
embarked and disembarked. Therefore, although the location data with information of passengers 
is valuable for secondary use such as for the marketing of shops along the bus line, attackers may 
be able to identify personal information of a specific passenger from the data. The number of 
records in the anonymized data was set to 3,000, which is the average number of passengers that 
ride on one bus in one month [82]. MeCab [83] was used to split the name of bus stops for 
anonymization. 
The concordance rate of a watermarked bit string extracted from attacked anonymized data 
was measured when the bit string is compared with the correct bit string. Figure 6-24, Figure 
6-25, and Figure 6-26 display the measurement results of the tolerance to the deleting, adding, 
and replacing attacks, respectively. The vertical axes indicate the average of the concordance 
rate while the measurement was executed twenty times for each attacking rate shown in the 
horizontal axes. The attacking rate expresses the rate of the number of records that are deleted, 
added, or replaced by the distortion attacks compared with the original number of records in the 
 
Figure 6-24 Tolerance against deleting attack 
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data. The attacking rate was set from 5% to 95% at 5% intervals. Results of the masking method 
and the extension method were the same since their comparison algorithms at the extraction 
process of the watermarked information are the same. The watermarked information was 256 bits 
long. 
Figure 6-24 shows that the most tolerant methods against the deleting attack are the masking 
method and the extension method when the attacking rate is 85% or smaller. Figure 6-25 shows 
that all abstraction methods except the arranging method keep the concordance rate to 96% or 
larger against the adding attack. Figure 6-26 shows similar measurement results as in Figure 
6-24 because their algorithms of attack are similar. The replacing attack can be regarded as a 
combination of the deleting attack and the adding attack with the same attack rates, and the 
influence of the adding attack against this similarity is comparatively small since the proposed 
watermarking method is tolerant against the addition attack except when using the arranging 
method. 
When the attacking rate is high, the extracted bit string consists of a large number of ‘0's 
since the proposed watermarking method expresses watermarked information by the number of 
modified records. Additionally, half of the ciphertext of AES consists of ‘0's. Therefore, the 
concordance rates in the three measurement results come close to 50%. The three measurement 
results show that the arranging method is not tolerant of distortion attacks since its concordance 
rate is 50%. However, this weakness can be an advantage when the arranging method is used to 
detect data modification. 
 
Figure 6-25 Tolerance against adding attack 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Av
er
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
co
nc
or
da
nc
e 
ra
te
 [%
]
Attacking rate [%]
Masking method and extension method
Arranging method
Replacing method
6  Watermarking method for anonymized data 
77 
 
 
6.4.2 Effectiveness of use of gray code 
The proposed watermarking method adopts to use the gray code to enhance the tolerance 
against distortion attacks. The success rate of error correction of two conditions that the 
implemented gray code was either enabled or disabled were compared to measure the 
effectiveness of the use of the gray code. The attacking rate was set from 5% to 95% at 5% intervals. 
Ten thousand records of the anonymized data used in Section 6.4.1 was used to the evaluation. 
The masking method and the deleting attack were selected to the abstraction method and the 
distortion attack, respectively. Figure 6-27 shows the result of the comparison. The vertical axes 
indicate the success rate of the error correction while the measurement was executed twenty 
times for each attacking rate shown in the horizontal axes. The result shows that the success 
rate is increased by using a gray code. 
6.4.3 Availability of the proposed watermarking method in the proposed 
infrastructure 
Situations that are similar to the attacks described in Section 6.4.1 can be supposed to exist 
where attackers use the same kind of distortion attacks in DTI4SFS. The adding attack can be 
regarded as a situation where multiple anonymized data tables are gathered into one data table. 
According to the measurement results, the proposed watermarking method can extract at least 
96% of the watermarked information even if the anonymized data is combined with other data 
 
Figure 6-26 Tolerance against replacing attack 
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whose size is 95% of the anonymized data. The deleting attack can be regarded as a part of the 
anonymized data being republished. In the deleting attack, the concordance rates of the masking 
method and the extension attack are 50% when the attacking rate is 70% or higher. Therefore, 
the proposed watermarking method is effective in identifying whether the watermarking 
information is embedded or not if the republished data includes at least 30% of the original 
anonymized data. This tolerance is sufficient because anonymized data has no value when 70% of 
its records are lost. 
6.4.4 Information loss due to watermarking 
The proposed watermarking method modifies values of anonymized data using the four 
abstraction methods described in Section 6.2.3. Since the abstraction methods except the 
arranging method generalize the values, these three abstraction methods cause information loss. 
Figure 6-28 shows information loss in the evaluation of Section 6.4.1. The extension method and 
replacing method abstract a part of a value by adding candidates of the part or replacing the part 
whereas the masking method completely hide the part. Because of the difference, the information 
of both the extension and replacing methods are 19 times smaller than the masking method. Since 
the arranging method does not modify the values, this abstraction method can be used to detect 
data modification without information loss caused by the arranging method. 
  
 
Figure 6-27 Comparison of success rates of the error correction 
 between using and not using gray code 
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6.5 Summary 
In this section, a watermarking method for anonymized data was proposed and implemented 
while assuming the proposed method is used to identify the user that republished the anonymized 
data without authorization within DTI4SFS. The proposal facilitates the secondary use of data 
that may include privacy information by providing an approach to generate identifiable 
anonymized data. The proposed watermarking method consists of AES, turbo code, and a gray 
code converter to protect watermarking information from collusion attacks and distortion attacks. 
Experimental results showed that the proposed watermarking method could extract more than 
95% of the watermarked information from anonymized data even if the data is combined with other 
records whose size is 95% of the data. Also, the embedding of watermarked information can be 
detected from data that is 30% of the anonymized data. For the information loss caused by the 
proposed abstraction methods, the experimental result showed that the extension and replacing 
methods were 19 times smaller than the masking method. 
 
 
Figure 6-28 Comparison of Information loss among abstraction methods 
 
Abstraction methods Increase of information loss
Masking method 0.1508
Replacing method 0.007829
Extension method 0.007829
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7 Conclusion 
In this study, a data transaction infrastructure for safe and flexible sharing of private 
information (DTI4SFS) has been proposed. DTI4SFS uses anonymization techniques for the safety 
while focusing on data sharing. Anonymization generalizes values in data to eliminate uniqueness 
of records in the data. The generalization prevents identification of a record relating to a specific 
person by attackers. For the flexibility, DTI4SFS enables to share data including containing 
private information from data providers to data users while preserving regarding data privacy. 
DTI4SFS allows both data providers and data users to claim their requirements regarding the 
data sharing by creating either publishing or request rules, which are based on a proposed format 
named XML-based Anonymization Sheets (XAS). The detail of DTI4SFS have been proposed and 
described in Section 3.  
Several methods have also been proposed in this study to enhance abilities of DTI4SFS. One 
of the proposed methods is regarding the anonymization process, which is a core process in 
DTI4SFS. The anonymization process tends to be a bottleneck of the entire process of DTI4SFS 
because all the data must be anonymized. For overcoming the bottleneck, a hardware 
implementation of an anonymizer has been proposed in Section 4. The proposed anonymizer 
showed 82.3% reduction in circuit size compared to existing anonymizer based on TCAM. The 
maximum throughput of the anonymizer was 8.75Gbps. The throughput of the proposed 
anonymizer is enough to anonymize data at a line speed of OC48 or faster until 8.75Gbps. 
When focusing on data type, it is better if DTI4SFS can share time-series data because some 
data such as sensor data take this data type. On the other hand, general anonymization methods 
are not suitable for time-series data. In Section 5, an anonymization method using self-organizing 
map to share time-series data has been proposed so that DTI4SFS can share time-series data 
while preserving data privacy using anonymization. The proposed anonymization method achieves 
the same level of 𝑘-anonymity with small information loss compared with other conventional 
method that each data provider anonymizes aggregated data without data sharing among data 
providers. Information loss was reduced up to 22%. 
In this study, a watermarking method for anonymized data has been proposed to suppress 
unauthorized republishing from malicious data users. Anonymized data published from DTI4SFS 
are same when requests from data users are same each other. Therefore, the malicious data user 
is not able to be identified from the republished anonymized data. For overcoming the problem, 
the watermarking method makes the anonymized data unique for each data user even if multiple 
data users submit the same request rules. The watermarking method adds a watermark into the 
data by modifying the values of the anonymized data to identify the users who received the data 
from DTI4SFS. The proposed watermarking method consists of AES, turbo code, and a gray code 
converter to protect watermarking information from collusion attacks and distortion attacks. 
Experimental results showed that the proposed watermarking method could extract more than 
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95% of the watermarked information from anonymized data even if the data is combined with other 
records whose size is 95% of the data. Additionally, the embedding of watermarked information 
can be detected from data that is 30% of the anonymized data. For the information loss caused 
by the proposed abstraction methods, the experimental result showed that the extension and 
replacing methods were 19 times smaller than the masking method. 
The data transaction infrastructure proposed in this study enables data sharing flexibly while 
preserving private information contained in the shared data. The proposed infrastructure 
facilitates the secondary use of data including private information since the proposed 
infrastructure enables data sharing among third-party data users. If big data are shared for 
secondary use through the proposed infrastructure, applications that have not realized yet would 
be developed so that the applications make our lives better while preserving our privacy. 
DTI4SFS facilitates services with secondary use of data because DTI4SFS allows data providers, 
i.e. the clients of the services, to manage and publish their data while preserving their privacy. 
Additionally, DTI4SFS enables data providers to actively manage their data for data publishing. 
This feature would promote secondary use of data by reducing anxiety of data providers regarding 
the data privacy. 
For realizing the services, further practical studies would be required such as the 
implementation of DTI4SFS while assuming concrete situations and services. The author of this 
dissertation has studied regarding secure data communication on wireless sensor network [84]. 
This study will be applicable to implement DTI4SFS on IoT networks. Here is another study 
regarding precise time synchronization [85]. Although this study would not be directly applicable 
for the implementations, the idea of the study would be useful to provide strict data transaction 
in terms of precise timestamp. Further studies to increase number of data types for data sharing 
would also be required such as location data to enhance scalability of DTI4SFS. Moreover, from 
the view point of usability, studies to propose applications that use anonymized data based on 
DTI4SFS are meaningful. Through the study in this dissertation and these future works, future 
that people share their data with privacy preservation would be realized. 
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